Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2018 13:05:58 -0800 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> To: tglx@...utronix.de Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, x86@...nel.org, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Andrew Honig <ahonig@...gle.com>, alan@...ux.intel.com, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@...il.com>, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net> Subject: [PATCH v4.1 00/10] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Hi Thomas, Please consider taking this collection of spectre-v1 mitigations through the tip/x86/pti branch for 4.16 inclusion. The review feedback has dropped off considerably, so I believe these patches are ready for -tip inclusion. However, "nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params" stands out as a patch that should get an ack from net/wireless folks before moving forward. Also a heads up that x86/pti is missing commit 75f139aaf896 "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup", so you will hit a trivial conflict merging "kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation" from this set against latest mainline. The infrastructure includes: * __uaccess_begin_nospec: similar to __uaccess_begin this invokes 'stac', but it also includes an 'ifence'. After an 'access_ok' check has speculatively succeeded that result needs to be retired before the user pointer is de-referenced. '__get_user' can't use the pointer sanitization approach without redoing the 'access_ok' check, so per Linus  just use 'ifence'. * MASK_NOSPEC: an assembler macro for x86 'get_user' and syscall entry that sanitizes a user controlled pointer or array index to zero after a 'cmp %limit %val' instruction sets the CF flag. * array_ptr: When dereferencing a kernel pointer with a user controlled index, sanitize the pointer to either NULL or valid addresses under speculation to eliminate a precondition for Spectre variant1 attacks. It uses a mask generation technique that does not involve speculative control flows on either x86 or ARM64 . * x86 array_ptr_mask: Achieve the same effect as the default 'array_ptr_mask' in fewer instructions. This approach does not have the same "array index and limit must be less than LONG_MAX" constraint as the default mask. * array_idx: Similar to 'array_ptr', use a mask to return a valid pointer or NULL to an array index variable. An example where we need this is the wireless driver stack where the core sanitizes user input and the actual usage of the array index is in a different compilation unit in the low-level driver. : https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/17/929 : https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg477542.html --- Dan Williams (9): asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references x86: implement array_ptr_mask() x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Mark Rutland (1): Documentation: document array_ptr Documentation/speculation.txt | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 28 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 - arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 24 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +++- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 11 ++- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 5 + arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 +- include/linux/fdtable.h | 7 +- include/linux/nospec.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++ net/wireless/nl80211.c | 10 ++- 14 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/speculation.txt create mode 100644 include/linux/nospec.h
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