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Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 23:59:46 +1100
From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@...il.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>, "linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "mingo\@kernel.org" <mingo@...nel.org>, "jiangshanlai\@gmail.com" <jiangshanlai@...il.com>, "dipankar\@in.ibm.com" <dipankar@...ibm.com>, "akpm\@linux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "mathieu.desnoyers\@efficios.com" <mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com>, "josh\@joshtriplett.org" <josh@...htriplett.org>, "tglx\@linutronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "peterz\@infradead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, "rostedt\@goodmis.org" <rostedt@...dmis.org>, "dhowells\@redhat.com" <dhowells@...hat.com>, "edumazet\@google.com" <edumazet@...gle.com>, "fweisbec\@gmail.com" <fweisbec@...il.com>, "oleg\@redhat.com" <oleg@...hat.com>, "kernel-hardening\@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
Subject: Re: Long live %pK (was Re: [PATCH tip/core/rcu 02/20] torture: Prepare scripting for shift from %p to %pK)
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
> This is a perfect example of just %pK being complete shit.
>
> %pK doesn't actually do any file permissions right. It looks like it does
> it, but it's just a hot mess of garbage.
>
> And %pK doesn't even work the way you claim it does. Not in the general
> case, and only with a particular value.
Right. My email was only about the kptr_restrict = 1 case, but I didn't
actually make that clear.
But that's also sort of my point, it has multiple modes of operation,
which is useful.
> On Dec 11, 2017 21:26, "Michael Ellerman" <mpe@...erman.id.au> wrote: I
> >
> >
> > I understand that the CAP_SYSLOG checking that %pK does is kind of
> > gross, but it does work in at least some useful cases like this.
> >
> > What am I missing?
>
>
> Just do the damn thing right, like /proc/kallsyms does these days.
>
> With the proper open time cred check, not the wrong one at io time.
OK, that's the piece I was missing - ie. what to do in the case where
%px for all users is too permissive but %p is not useful.
> Which has the added advantage that it actually does the right thing even
> when you don't have kptr_restrict set, or when you have patches to make it
> print zero even for people with capabilities.
>
> Don't depend on some random flag that has nothing to do with your actual
> example and that has random values for security.
> Just say no to kptr_restrict "logic". Your example basically depends
> entirely on one particular setting, when (a) real distributions have a
> different value and expose those pointers that your claim shouldn't be
> exposed and (b) other people are pushing for values that will hide the
> values that you claim area needed.
I'm still a bit confused by the above. Because kallsyms which is your
example of how to do it right, still uses kptr_restrict. I get that it
also checks kallsyms_for_perf(), but that's only in the
kptr_restrict = 0 case.
Anyway, I'll do a patch for vmallocinfo to do the CAP_SYSLOG check at
open time, and use that to decide if it should print 0 or the address.
I can't think of any other flag or setting to sensibly determine if
vmallocinfo should be visible, so I've just done:
if (kptr_restrict < 2 && has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG))
priv->show_addrs = true;
else
priv->show_addrs = false;
So basically visible to root, unless kptr_restrict == 2, otherwise not
visible.
cheers
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