Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 18:08:34 -0800 From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>, LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module_cap() to load 'netdev-%s' modules On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 4:44 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: > >> That mainly leaves the protocol ones we need to look out for, I suspect. > > This is where a lot of the exposure really comes from. socket() > triggers a bunch of stuff, but doesn't have an obvious privilege > associated with it... while it already does the name templates, maybe > add request_module_socket() just to explicitly mark it? .. and this is where I'd expect that maybe we'd need some hackery. Even including some ad-hoc rules like "this module is actually maintained", possibly even with some /sys interface to extend/reduce that set. But maybe it's not even that bad. Linus
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