Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 10:58:16 -0500 (EST)
From: David Miller <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add

From: Theodore Ts'o <>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 10:54:06 -0500

> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 09:50:14AM -0500, David Miller wrote:
>> From: Alan Cox <>
>> Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 13:46:12 +0000
>> > I really don't care what the module loading rules end up with and
>> > whether we add CAP_SYS_YET_ANOTHER_MEANINGLESS_FLAG but what is
>> > actually needed is to properly incorporate it into securiy ruiles
>> > for whatever LSM you are using.
>> I'm surprised we're not using the SHA1 hashes or whatever we compute
>> for the modules to make sure we are loading the foo.ko that we expect
>> to be.
> We do have signed modules.  But this won't help us if the user is
> using a distro kernel which has compiled some module which is known to
> be unmaintained which everyone in the know *expects* to have 0-day
> bugs, such as DCCP.  That's because the DCCP module is signed.

That's not what we're talking about.

We're talking about making sure that loading "ppp.ko" really gets
ppp.ko rather than some_other_module.ko renamed to ppp.ko via some
other mechanism.

Both modules have legitimate signatures so the kernel will happily
load both.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.