Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 09:50:14 -0500 (EST) From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net> To: gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: keescook@...omium.org, mcgrof@...nel.org, tixxdz@...il.com, luto@...nel.org, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, james.l.morris@...cle.com, ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk, solar@...nwall.com, serge@...lyn.com, jeyu@...nel.org, rusty@...tcorp.com.au, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, corbet@....net, mingo@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org, torvalds@...ux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap() From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk> Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 13:46:12 +0000 > I really don't care what the module loading rules end up with and > whether we add CAP_SYS_YET_ANOTHER_MEANINGLESS_FLAG but what is > actually needed is to properly incorporate it into securiy ruiles > for whatever LSM you are using. I'm surprised we're not using the SHA1 hashes or whatever we compute for the modules to make sure we are loading the foo.ko that we expect to be. Then even if someone can rename every file on the system they cannot force a rogue module to load unless they build one with a proper hash collision. Ie. transform module load strings at build time: ppp.ko --> ppp.ko:SHA1 Or something like that. And the kernel refuses to load a ppp.ko with a mismatching SHA1. All of this capability stuff seems to dance a circle around the problem rather than fix it.
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