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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 12:11:34 -0800
From: Kees Cook <>
To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <>, Andy Lutomirski <>, 
	Andrew Morton <>, James Morris <>, 
	Ben Hutchings <>, Solar Designer <>, 
	Serge Hallyn <>, Jessica Yu <>, 
	Rusty Russell <>, LKML <>, 
	linux-security-module <>,, 
	Jonathan Corbet <>, Ingo Molnar <>, 
	"David S. Miller" <>, Network Development <>, 
	Peter Zijlstra <>, Linus Torvalds <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap()

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 11:14 AM, Luis R. Rodriguez <> wrote:
> kmod is just a helper to poke userpsace to load a module, that's it.
> The old init_module() and newer finit_module() do the real handy work or
> module loading, and both currently only use may_init_module():
> static int may_init_module(void)
> {
>         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) || modules_disabled)
>                 return -EPERM;
>         return 0;
> }
> This begs the question:
>   o If userspace just tries to just use raw finit_module() do we want similar
>     checks?
> Otherwise, correct me if I'm wrong this all seems pointless.

Hm? That's direct-loading, not auto-loading. This series is only about

We already have a global sysctl for blocking direct-loading (modules_disabled).

> If we want something similar I think we might need to be processing aliases and
> check for the aliases for their desired restrictions on finit_module(),

We don't need to handle aliases.


Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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