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Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2017 15:35:11 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 06:37:28AM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 10:06:46AM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > On Sun, Nov 12, 2017 at 02:10:07AM +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > > On Tue, Nov 07, 2017 at 09:32:11PM +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote:
> > > > Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
> > > > script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
> > > > `dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
> > > > kernel addresses.
> > > >
> > > > Only works for 64 bit kernels, the reason being that kernel addresses
> > > > on 64 bit kernels have 'ffff' as the leading bit pattern making greping
> > > > possible. On 32 kernels we don't have this luxury.
> > >
> > > Well, it's not going to work as well as intented on x86 machine with
> > > 5-level paging. Kernel address space there starts at 0xff10000000000000.
> > > It will still catch pointers to kernel/modules text, but the rest is
> > > outside of 0xffff... space. See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt.
> >
> > Thanks for the link. So it looks like we need to refactor the kernel
> > address regular expression into a function that takes into account the
> > machine architecture and the number of page table levels. We will need
> > to add this to the false positive checks also.
> >
> > > Not sure if we care. It won't work too for other 64-bit architectrues that
> > > have more than 256TB of virtual address space.
> >
> > Is this because of the virtual memory map?
>
> On x86 direct mapping is the nearest thing we have to userspace.
>
> > Did you mean 512TB?
>
> No, I mean 256TB.
>
> You have all kernel memory in the range from 0xffff000000000000 to
> 0xffffffffffffffff if you have 256 TB of virtual address space. If you
> hvae more, some thing might be ouside the range.
Doesn't 4-level paging already limit a system to 64TB of memory? So any
system better equipped than this will use 5-level paging right? If I am
totally talking rubbish please ignore, I'm appreciative that you pointed
out the limitation already. Perhaps we can add a comment to the script
# Script may miss some addresses on machines with more than 256TB of
# memory.
thanks,
Tobin.
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