Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 11:06:44 +1100 From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc> To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>, Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com> Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, William Roberts <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com> Subject: [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options Version 2 of Greg's patch series with changes made as suggested by comments to V1. Applies on top of Linus' current development tree a8c964eacb21288b2dbfa9d80cee5968a3b8fb21 V1 cover letter: Here's a short patch series from Chris Fries and Dave Weinstein that implements some new restrictions when printing out kernel pointers, as well as the ability to whitelist kernel pointers where needed. These patches are based on work from William Roberts, and also are inspired by grsecurity's %pP to specifically whitelist a kernel pointer, where it is always needed, like the last patch in the series shows, in the UIO drivers (UIO requires that you know the address, it's a hardware address, nothing wrong with seeing that...) I haven't done much to this patch series, only forward porting it from an older kernel release (4.4) and a few minor tweaks. [snip] V1 -> V2: * Renamed function kptr_restrict_always_cleanse_pointers() to kptr_restrict_cleanse_kernel_pointers() (as suggested by Petr Mladek). * Re-ordered switch statement (within pointer()) to place default at the end of the statement (as suggested by Petr Mladek). * Updated Documentation/printk-formats.txt (as suggested by Joe Perches). * Updated Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt (as suggested by Petr Mladek). Suggestion by Ian Campbell to add comments on the threat model being mitigated by use of %pa vs %paP etc is not implemented because I do not know the threat model (I'm only the janitor). Happy to add them if someone writes them. thanks, Tobin. Tobin C. Harding (6): lib: vsprintf: additional kernel pointer filtering options lib: vsprintf: whitelist stack traces lib: vsprintf: physical address kernel pointer filtering options lib: vsprintf: default kptr_restrict to the maximum value lib: vsprintf: add "%paP", "%papP", and "%padP" specifiers drivers: uio: un-restrict sysfs pointers for UIO Documentation/printk-formats.txt | 27 ++++++++-- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 9 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 4 +- drivers/uio/uio.c | 4 +- kernel/printk/printk.c | 2 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- lib/vsprintf.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- scripts/checkpatch.pl | 2 +- 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) -- 2.7.4
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