Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 15:45:07 +0200 From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de> To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@...il.com>, security@...nel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v6] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto Am Mittwoch, 20. September 2017, 12:52:21 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld: Hi Jason, > > This sounds incorrect to me. Choosing a fresh, random, one-time-use > 256-bit key and rolling with a zero nonce is a totally legitimate way > of using GCM. There's no possible reuse of the key stream this way. > However, on the off chance that you know what you're talking about, > could you outline the cryptographic attack you have in mind, or if > that's too difficult, simply link to the relevant paper on eprint? http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/Joux_comments.pdf Ciao Stephan
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