Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2017 21:50:18 +0200 From: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com> Subject: [RFC v3 0/9] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM S.A.R.A. (S.A.R.A. is Another Recursive Acronym) is a stacked Linux Security Module that aims to collect heterogeneous security measures, providing a common interface to manage them. It can be useful to allow minor security features to use advanced management options, like user-space configuration files and tools, without too much overhead. Some submodules that use this framework are also introduced. The code is quite long, I apologize for this. Thank you in advance to anyone who will take the time to review this patchset. S.A.R.A. is meant to be stacked but it needs cred blobs and the procattr interface, so I temporarily implemented those parts in a way that won't be acceptable for upstream, but it works for now. I know that there is some ongoing work to make cred blobs and procattr stackable, as soon as the new interfaces will be available I'll reimplement the involved parts. At the moment I've been able to test it only on x86. The only submodule introduced in this patchset is WX Protection. The kernel-space part is complemented by its user-space counterpart: saractl . A test suite for WX Protection, called sara-test , is also available. WX Protection aims to improve user-space programs security by applying: - W^X enforcement: program can't have a page of memory that is marked, at the same time, writable and executable. - W!->X restriction: any page that could have been marked as writable in the past won't ever be allowed to be marked as executable. - Executable MMAP prevention: prevents the creation of new executable mmaps after the dynamic libraries have been loaded. All of the above features can be enabled or disabled both system wide or on a per executable basis through the use of configuration files managed by "saractl". It is important to note that some programs may have issues working with WX Protection. In particular: - W^X enforcement will cause problems to any programs that needs memory pages mapped both as writable and executable at the same time e.g. programs with executable stack markings in the PT_GNU_STACK segment. - W!->X restriction will cause problems to any program that needs to generate executable code at run time or to modify executable pages e.g. programs with a JIT compiler built-in or linked against a non-PIC library. - Executable MMAP prevention can work only with programs that have at least partial RELRO support. It's disabled automatically for programs that lack this feature. It will cause problems to any program that uses dlopen or tries to do an executable mmap. Unfortunately this feature is the one that could create most problems and should be enabled only after careful evaluation. To extend the scope of the above features, despite the issues that they may cause, they are complemented by: - procattr interface: can be used by a program to discover which WX Protection features are enabled and/or to tighten them. - Trampoline emulation: emulates the execution of well-known "trampolines" even when they are placed in non-executable memory. Parts of WX Protection are inspired by some of the features available in PaX. More information can be found in the documentation introduced in the first patch and in the "commit message" of the following emails. Changes in v2: - Removed USB filtering submodule and relative hook - s/saralib/libsara/ typo - STR macro renamed to avoid conflicts - check_vmflags hook now returns an error code instead of just 1 or 0. (suggested by Casey Schaufler) - pr_wxp macro rewritten as function for readability - Fixed i386 compilation warnings - Documentation now states clearly that changes done via procattr interface only apply to current thread. (suggested by Jann Horn) Changes in v3: - Documentation has been moved to match the new directory structure. - Kernel cmdline arguments are now accessed via module_param interface (suggested by Kees Cook). - Created "sara_warn_or_return" macro to make WX Protection code more readable (suggested by Kees Cook). - Added more comments, in the most important places, to clarify my intentions (suggested by Kees Cook). - The "pagefault_handler" hook has been rewritten in a more "arch agnostic" way. Though it only support x86 at the moment (suggested by Kees Cook). Suggested improvements not added in v3: - Kees Cook suggested to add the VMA as an argument to "check_vmflags" hook, because it could be useful for other potential users, but he wasn't certain about it. So I decided to not change this for the moment. - Kees Cook suggested to move "trampolines.h" to "arch/x86". I'm not sure what would be the best place to put it, so, for the moment, I didn't move it.  https://github.com/smeso/saractl  https://github.com/smeso/sara-test Salvatore Mesoraca (9): S.A.R.A. Documentation S.A.R.A. framework creation Creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook S.A.R.A. cred blob management S.A.R.A. WX Protection Creation of "pagefault_handler" LSM hook Trampoline emulation Allowing for stacking procattr support in S.A.R.A. S.A.R.A. WX Protection procattr interface Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst | 170 +++++ Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 24 + arch/Kconfig | 6 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 6 + fs/proc/base.c | 38 + include/linux/cred.h | 3 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 24 + include/linux/security.h | 17 + mm/mmap.c | 13 + security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/sara/Kconfig | 136 ++++ security/sara/Makefile | 4 + security/sara/include/sara.h | 29 + security/sara/include/sara_data.h | 47 ++ security/sara/include/securityfs.h | 59 ++ security/sara/include/trampolines.h | 173 +++++ security/sara/include/utils.h | 80 ++ security/sara/include/wxprot.h | 27 + security/sara/main.c | 117 +++ security/sara/sara_data.c | 79 ++ security/sara/securityfs.c | 560 ++++++++++++++ security/sara/utils.c | 151 ++++ security/sara/wxprot.c | 973 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 37 +- 27 files changed, 2776 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst create mode 100644 security/sara/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/sara/Makefile create mode 100644 security/sara/include/sara.h create mode 100644 security/sara/include/sara_data.h create mode 100644 security/sara/include/securityfs.h create mode 100644 security/sara/include/trampolines.h create mode 100644 security/sara/include/utils.h create mode 100644 security/sara/include/wxprot.h create mode 100644 security/sara/main.c create mode 100644 security/sara/sara_data.c create mode 100644 security/sara/securityfs.c create mode 100644 security/sara/utils.c create mode 100644 security/sara/wxprot.c -- 1.9.1
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