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Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 16:36:36 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>,
	linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 22/23] usercopy: split user-controlled slabs to separate caches

From: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>

Some userspace APIs (e.g. ipc, seq_file) provide precise control over
the size of kernel kmallocs, which provides a trivial way to perform
heap overflow attacks where the attacker must control neighboring
allocations of a specific size. Instead, move these APIs into their own
cache so they cannot interfere with standard kmallocs. This is enabled
with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY_SLABS
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@...lcore.net>
[kees: added SLAB_NO_MERGE flag to allow split of future no-merge Kconfig]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
 fs/seq_file.c        |  2 +-
 include/linux/gfp.h  |  9 ++++++++-
 include/linux/slab.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 ipc/msgutil.c        |  5 +++--
 mm/slab.h            |  3 ++-
 mm/slab_common.c     | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/Kconfig     | 12 ++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/seq_file.c b/fs/seq_file.c
index dc7c2be963ed..5caa58a19bdc 100644
--- a/fs/seq_file.c
+++ b/fs/seq_file.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ static void seq_set_overflow(struct seq_file *m)
 
 static void *seq_buf_alloc(unsigned long size)
 {
-	return kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	return kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_USERCOPY);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
index a89d37e8b387..ff4f4a698ad0 100644
--- a/include/linux/gfp.h
+++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
 #else
 #define ___GFP_NOLOCKDEP	0
 #endif
+#define ___GFP_USERCOPY		0x4000000u
 /* If the above are modified, __GFP_BITS_SHIFT may need updating */
 
 /*
@@ -83,12 +84,17 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
  *   node with no fallbacks or placement policy enforcements.
  *
  * __GFP_ACCOUNT causes the allocation to be accounted to kmemcg.
+ *
+ * __GFP_USERCOPY indicates that the page will be explicitly copied to/from
+ *   userspace, and may be allocated from a separate kmalloc pool.
+ *
  */
 #define __GFP_RECLAIMABLE ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_RECLAIMABLE)
 #define __GFP_WRITE	((__force gfp_t)___GFP_WRITE)
 #define __GFP_HARDWALL   ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_HARDWALL)
 #define __GFP_THISNODE	((__force gfp_t)___GFP_THISNODE)
 #define __GFP_ACCOUNT	((__force gfp_t)___GFP_ACCOUNT)
+#define __GFP_USERCOPY	((__force gfp_t)___GFP_USERCOPY)
 
 /*
  * Watermark modifiers -- controls access to emergency reserves
@@ -188,7 +194,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
 #define __GFP_NOLOCKDEP ((__force gfp_t)___GFP_NOLOCKDEP)
 
 /* Room for N __GFP_FOO bits */
-#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (25 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))
+#define __GFP_BITS_SHIFT (26 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOCKDEP))
 #define __GFP_BITS_MASK ((__force gfp_t)((1 << __GFP_BITS_SHIFT) - 1))
 
 /*
@@ -268,6 +274,7 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
 #define GFP_TRANSHUGE_LIGHT	((GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_COMP | \
 			 __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | __GFP_NOWARN) & ~__GFP_RECLAIM)
 #define GFP_TRANSHUGE	(GFP_TRANSHUGE_LIGHT | __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM)
+#define GFP_USERCOPY	__GFP_USERCOPY
 
 /* Convert GFP flags to their corresponding migrate type */
 #define GFP_MOVABLE_MASK (__GFP_RECLAIMABLE|__GFP_MOVABLE)
diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
index 97f4a0117b3b..7d9d7d838991 100644
--- a/include/linux/slab.h
+++ b/include/linux/slab.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #define SLAB_POISON		0x00000800UL	/* DEBUG: Poison objects */
 #define SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN	0x00002000UL	/* Align objs on cache lines */
 #define SLAB_CACHE_DMA		0x00004000UL	/* Use GFP_DMA memory */
+#define SLAB_NO_MERGE		0x00008000UL	/* Keep this cache unmerged */
 #define SLAB_STORE_USER		0x00010000UL	/* DEBUG: Store the last owner for bug hunting */
 #define SLAB_PANIC		0x00040000UL	/* Panic if kmem_cache_create() fails */
 /*
@@ -287,6 +288,17 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_dma_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
 #endif
 
 /*
+ * Some userspace APIs (ipc, seq_file) provide precise control over
+ * the size of kernel kmallocs, which provides a trivial way to perform
+ * heap overflow attacks where the attacker must control neighboring
+ * allocations.  Instead, move these APIs into their own cache so they
+ * cannot interfere with standard kmallocs.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+extern struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_usersized_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
+#endif
+
+/*
  * Figure out which kmalloc slab an allocation of a certain size
  * belongs to.
  * 0 = zero alloc
diff --git a/ipc/msgutil.c b/ipc/msgutil.c
index bf74eaa5c39f..5ae33d50da26 100644
--- a/ipc/msgutil.c
+++ b/ipc/msgutil.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
 	size_t alen;
 
 	alen = min(len, DATALEN_MSG);
-	msg = kmalloc(sizeof(*msg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	msg = kmalloc(sizeof(*msg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | GFP_USERCOPY);
 	if (msg == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ static struct msg_msg *alloc_msg(size_t len)
 	while (len > 0) {
 		struct msg_msgseg *seg;
 		alen = min(len, DATALEN_SEG);
-		seg = kmalloc(sizeof(*seg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		seg = kmalloc(sizeof(*seg) + alen, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT |
+			GFP_USERCOPY);
 		if (seg == NULL)
 			goto out_err;
 		*pseg = seg;
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 4cdc8e64fdbd..874b755f278d 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ static inline unsigned long kmem_cache_flags(unsigned long object_size,
 
 /* Legal flag mask for kmem_cache_create(), for various configurations */
 #define SLAB_CORE_FLAGS (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | SLAB_PANIC | \
-			 SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS )
+			 SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_DEBUG_OBJECTS | \
+			 SLAB_NO_MERGE)
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB)
 #define SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER)
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 2365dd21623d..6c14d765379f 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
  */
 #define SLAB_NEVER_MERGE (SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_POISON | SLAB_STORE_USER | \
 		SLAB_TRACE | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_NOLEAKTRACE | \
-		SLAB_FAILSLAB | SLAB_KASAN)
+		SLAB_FAILSLAB | SLAB_KASAN | SLAB_NO_MERGE)
 
 #define SLAB_MERGE_SAME (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT | SLAB_CACHE_DMA | \
 			 SLAB_NOTRACK | SLAB_ACCOUNT)
@@ -940,6 +940,11 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_dma_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_dma_caches);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_usersized_caches[KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1];
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_usersized_caches);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Conversion table for small slabs sizes / 8 to the index in the
  * kmalloc array. This is necessary for slabs < 192 since we have non power
@@ -1004,6 +1009,12 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 		return kmalloc_dma_caches[index];
 
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+	if (unlikely((flags & GFP_USERCOPY)))
+		return kmalloc_usersized_caches[index];
+#endif
+
 	return kmalloc_caches[index];
 }
 
@@ -1125,6 +1136,22 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(unsigned long flags)
 		}
 	}
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+	for (i = 0; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++) {
+		struct kmem_cache *s = kmalloc_caches[i];
+
+		if (s) {
+			int size = kmalloc_size(i);
+			char *n = kasprintf(GFP_NOWAIT,
+				"usersized-kmalloc-%d", size);
+
+			BUG_ON(!n);
+			kmalloc_usersized_caches[i] = create_kmalloc_cache(n,
+				size, SLAB_NO_MERGE | flags, 0, size);
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC */
 }
 #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
 
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 93027fdf47d1..0c181cebdb8a 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
 	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
 	  trying to find such users.
 
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC
+	bool "Isolate kernel caches from user-controlled allocations"
+	default HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	help
+	  This option creates a separate set of kmalloc caches used to
+	  satisfy allocations from userspace APIs that allow for
+	  fine-grained control over the size of kernel allocations.
+	  Without this, it is much easier for attackers to precisely
+	  size and attack heap overflows.  If their allocations are
+	  confined to a separate cache, attackers must find other ways
+	  to prepare heap attacks that will be near their desired target.
+
 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
 	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
 	help
-- 
2.7.4

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