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Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 20:41:34 -0400
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 05/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the
RNG is ready before using
On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 07:47:56PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Otherwise, we might be seeding the RNG using bad randomness, which is
> dangerous. The one use of this function from within the kernel -- not
> from userspace -- is being removed (keys/big_key), so that call site
> isn't relevant in assessing this.
The use in keys/big_key is _being_ removed, so this commit is
dependent on that commit landing, correct? (Order matters, because
otherwise we don't want to potentially screw up doing a kernel bisect
and causing their kernel to deadlock during the boot while they are
trying to track down an unreleated problem.)
- Ted
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