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Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2017 17:51:26 +0300
From: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@...wei.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
<casey@...aufler-ca.com>, <keescook@...omium.org>, <mhocko@...nel.org>,
<jmorris@...ei.org>
CC: <paul@...l-moore.com>, <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, <hch@...radead.org>,
<labbott@...hat.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] Make LSM Writable Hooks a command line option
On 06/06/17 17:36, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> Igor Stoppa wrote:
>> For the case at hand, would it work if there was a non-API call that you
>> could use until the API is properly expanded?
>
> Kernel command line switching (i.e. this patch) is fine for my use cases.
>
> SELinux folks might want
>
> -static int security_debug;
> +static int security_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE);
ok, thanks, I will add this
> so that those who are using SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config won't
> get oops upon boot by default. If "unlock the pool" were available,
> SELINUX=enforcing users would be happy. Maybe two modes for rw/ro transition helps.
>
> oneway rw -> ro transition mode: can't be made rw again by calling "unlock the pool" API
> twoway rw <-> ro transition mode: can be made rw again by calling "unlock the pool" API
This was in the first cut of the API, but I was told that it would
require further rework, to make it ok for upstream, so we agreed to do
first the lockdown/destroy only part and the the rewrite.
Is there really a valid use case for unloading SE Linux?
Or any other security module.
--
igor
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