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Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2017 18:30:08 -0400
From: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc: james.l.morris@...cle.com, serge@...lyn.com,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a
stackable LSM
On 06/03/2017 06:39 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 7:53 AM, Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com> wrote:
>> This patch was modified from Brad Spengler's Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
>> feature in Grsecurity and also incorporates logging ideas from
>> cormander's tpe-lkm.
>>
>> Modifications from the Grsecurity implementation of TPE were made to
>> turn it into a stackable LSM using the existing LSM hook bprm_set_creds.
>> Also, denial messages were improved by including the full path of the
>> disallowed program. (This idea was taken from cormander's tpe-lkm)
> [...]
>> Threat Models:
> [...]
>> 2. Attacker on system replaces binary used by a privileged user with a
>> malicious one
>>
>> * This situation arises when administrator of a system leaves a binary
>> as world writable.
>>
>> * TPE is very effective against this threat model
>
> How do you end up with world-writable binaries in $PATH?
>
Sys Admin screw up. It also protects against world-writable binaries
anywhere on the system, not just in $PATH.
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