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Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 12:48:50 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>
cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI
ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
On Mon, 29 May 2017, Boris Lukashev wrote:
> With all due respect sir, i believe your review falls short of the
> purpose of this effort - to harden the kernel against flaws in
> userspace.
Which effort? Kernel self protection is about protecting against flaws in
the kernel.
See:
https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project
"This project starts with the premise that kernel bugs have a very long
lifetime, and that the kernel must be designed in ways to protect against
these flaws."
We need to avoid conflating:
- hardening the kernel against attack; and
- modifying the kernel to try and harden userspace.
These patches are the latter, and the case for them is not as
straightforward.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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