Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sat, 27 May 2017 01:41:35 -0700
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/20] randstruct: Whitelist struct
 security_hook_heads cast

On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 01:17:09PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> The LSM initialization routines walk security_hook_heads as an array
> of struct list_head instead of via names to avoid a ton of needless
> source. Whitelist this to avoid the false positive warning from the
> plugin:

I think this crap just needs to be fixed properly.  If not it almost
defeats the protections as the "security" ops are just about everywhere.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.