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Date: Fri, 12 May 2017 21:21:06 +0100
From: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
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LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
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Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>,
linux-s390 <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>,
the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
René Nyffenegger <mail@...enyffenegger.ch>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
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Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address
limit before returning to user-mode
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 12:30:02PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> I'm clearly not explaining things well enough. I shouldn't say
> "corruption", I should say "malicious manipulation". The methodology
> of attacks against the stack are quite different from the other kinds
> of attacks like use-after-free, heap overflow, etc. Being able to
> exhaust the kernel stack (either due to deep recursion or unbounded
> alloca())
I really hope we don't have alloca() use in the kernel. Do you have
evidence to support that assertion?
IMHO alloca() (or similar) should not be present in any kernel code
because we have a limited stack - we have kmalloc() etc for that kind
of thing.
--
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
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