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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL6PeQmmdxh5h--fgrMK8DW_XZYpNfDOvvv_o9E3-Kxdw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 16:31:00 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, 
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, 
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>, 
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, 
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, 
	Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, 
	linux-s390 <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, 
	Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, 
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>, René Nyffenegger <mail@...enyffenegger.ch>, 
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, 
	Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, 
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, 
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, 
	"linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, 
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, 
	James Morse <james.morse@....com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, 
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>, 
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address
 limit before returning to user-mode

On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 3:52 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> wrote:
>>> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 06:02:50AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>>>> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 06:00:01AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> > fs/splice.c has some, ahem, interesting uses that have been the source
>>>> > of nasty exploits in the past.  Converting them to use iov_iter
>>>> > properly would be really, really nice.  Christoph, I don't suppose
>>>> > you'd like to do that?
>>>>
>>>> I can take care of all the fs code including this one.
>>>
>>> I spent the afternoon hacking up where I'd like this to head.  It's
>>> completely untested as of now:
>>>
>>>         http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/shortlog/refs/heads/setfs-elimination
>>
>> Ooooh yes! Nice work.
>>
>> I love this:
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/51e83f50f824ca23f5584c172138e6b7c2ff786d
>> but I wonder what it'll cause out-of-tree code to do. I mean, I'd
>> rather nothing out-of-tree be calling these, but I'd hate 3rd party
>> hacks even more.
>>
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/018e0e9030777121fe87e89d43066691e7366587
>> This accidentally(?) removes the kernel-doc comments.
>>
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/78b62c730254fc39fa888cdbdca08fde6e09a798
>> Could this be made defensive? (Return 0 if ret wraps, for example?) I
>> see what the comment says, but not everyone will read that. :(
>>
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/a106276ca0294be054bc89ce97219933fe543df1
>> Perhaps unconditionally set USER_DS on exit instead of retaining
>> whatever was there?
>
> I don't like silent fixups.  If we want to do this, we should BUG or
> at least WARN, not just change the addr limit.  But I'm also not
> convinced it's indicative of an actual bug here.

Nothing should enter that function with KERNEL_DS set, right?

BUG_ON(get_fs() != USER_DS);
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
...
set_fs(USER_DS);

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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