Date: Tue, 09 May 2017 11:30:57 -0400 From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, "Fogh, Anders" <anders.fogh@...ta-adan.de>, Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, "clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at" <clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at>, "moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at" <moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at>, Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@...k.tugraz.at>, Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@...dent.tugraz.at>, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not mapkernel in user mode On Tue, 2017-05-09 at 16:57 +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote: > Am 09.05.2017 um 16:44 schrieb Fogh, Anders: > > > > i.e. how does it perform on recent AMD systems? > > > > Sorry for the latency. Recent AMD is reported by Enrique Nissem to > > not > > be vulnerable to the prefetch attack. TSX attack doesn't apply to > > AMD. > > Hund, Willems & Holz wrote in 2013 that AMD was vulnerable to that > > attack. The BTB is almost surely working in a different manner of > > fashion if at all. So AMD may or may not be vulnerable to the DPF > > attack, but none of the modern attacks should work - at least out > > of the > > box. > > But the promoted patch will also run on AMD systems, that's why I > asked > for the overhead. Well, if it is a compile time switch, and the overhead is unacceptable on everything but the very latest Intel chips, chances are the code will not be enabled in any distribution kernel. -- All rights reversed Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (474 bytes)
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