Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 16:06:35 +0200 From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com> To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@...ibm.com>, Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, René Nyffenegger <mail@...enyffenegger.ch>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@...tuozzo.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, James Morse <james.morse@....com>, linux-s390 <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl> Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote: > > * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: > >> > And yes, I realize that there were other such bugs and that such bugs might >> > occur in the future - but why not push the overhead of the security check to >> > the kernel build phase? I.e. I'm wondering how well we could do static >> > analysis during kernel build - would a limited mode of Sparse be good enough >> > for that? Or we could add a new static checker to tools/, built from first >> > principles and used primarily for extended syntactical checking. >> >> Static analysis is just not going to cover all cases. We've had vulnerabilities >> where interrupt handlers left KERNEL_DS set, for example. [...] > > Got any commit ID of that bug - was it because a function executed by the > interrupt handler leaked KERNEL_DS? I think Kees might be talking about https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=822, fixed in commit e6978e4bf181fb3b5f8cb6f71b4fe30fbf1b655c. The issue was that perf code that can run in pretty much any context called access_ok().
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