Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 15:43:28 +0200
From: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
CC: David Gens <david.gens@...tu-darmstadt.de>,
        Thomas Garnier
	<thgarnie@...gle.com>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Kernel
 Hardening" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        <clementine.maurice@...k.tugraz.at>, <moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at>,
        "Michael
 Schwarz" <michael.schwarz@...k.tugraz.at>,
        Richard Fellner
	<richard.fellner@...dent.tugraz.at>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov"
	<kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, <anders.fogh@...ta-adan.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH] x86_64: KAISER - do not map
 kernel in user mode

On 08.05.2017 15:22, Mark Rutland wrote:
> Specifically, I think this does not align with the statement in 2.1
> regarding the two TTBRs:
>
>   This simplifies privilege checks and does not require any address
>   translation for invalid memory accesses and thus no cache lookups.
>
> ... since the use of the TTBRs is orthogonal to privilege checks and/or
> the design of the TLBs.

Ok, this is a good point, we will try to clarify this in the paper.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Your e-mail address:

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.