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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL_YgHon7Jdx=PT3pfggwy_zehc+wttvLX6BmvPSOxPfA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 09:42:12 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] add the option of fortified string.h functions
[adding lkml and rasmus to CC...]
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 7:24 AM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com> wrote:
> This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
> _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
> overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
> size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
> it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
>
> GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they're only
> designed to detect write overflows and are overly complex. A single
> inline branch works for everything but strncat while those intrinsics
> would force the creation of a bunch of extra non-inline wrappers that
> aren't able to receive the detected source buffer size.
>
> This detects various undefined uses of memcpy, etc. at compile-time
> outside of non-core kernel code, and in the arm64 vdso code, so there
> will need to be a series of fixes applied (mainly memcpy -> strncpy for
> copying string constants to avoid copying past the end of the source).
> It isn't particularly bad, but there are likely some issues that occur
> during regular use at runtime (none found so far).
>
> Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
> as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
>
> The fortified string functions should place a limit on reads from the
> source. For strcat/strcpy, these could just be a variant of strlcat /
> strlcpy using the size limit as a bound on both the source and
> destination, with the return value only reporting whether truncation
> occurred rather than providing the source length. It would be an easier
> API for developers to use too and not that it really matters but it
> would be more efficient for the case where truncation is intended.
>
> It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
> some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
> glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
> approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
>
> The error reporting could be made friendlier by splitting up the
> compile-time error for reads and writes. The runtime error could also
> directly report the buffer and copy sizes.
>
> It may make sense to have the compile-time checks in a separate
> configuration option since they wouldn't have a runtime performance cost
> if there was an ifdef for the runtime check. However, the runtime cost
> of these checks is already quite low (much lower than SSP) and as long
> as some people are using it with allyesconfig, the issues will be found
> for any in-tree code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 5 ++
> include/linux/string.h | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> lib/string.c | 8 ++
> security/Kconfig | 6 ++
> 4 files changed, 180 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
> index b3c5a5f030ce..43691238a21d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
> @@ -409,3 +409,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
> debug_putstr("done.\nBooting the kernel.\n");
> return output;
> }
> +
> +void fortify_panic(const char *name)
> +{
> + error("detected buffer overflow");
> +}
> diff --git a/include/linux/string.h b/include/linux/string.h
> index 26b6f6a66f83..3bd429c9593a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/string.h
> +++ b/include/linux/string.h
> @@ -169,4 +169,165 @@ static inline const char *kbasename(const char *path)
> return tail ? tail + 1 : path;
> }
>
> +#define __FORTIFY_INLINE extern __always_inline __attribute__((gnu_inline))
> +#define __RENAME(x) __asm__(#x)
> +
> +void fortify_panic(const char *name) __noreturn __cold;
> +void __buffer_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("buffer overflow");
I've been playing with this with allyesconfig on x86_64, and I've got
some suggestions I think would make things nicer for others looking at
this. How about splitting the compile-time buffer_overflow() report
into the write and read overflow pieces:
void __dst_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("writes beyond end of
destination buffer");
void __src_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("reads beyond end of
source buffer");
With things like memcpy split up:
if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
if (p_size < size)
__dst_overflow();
if (q_size < size)
__src_overflow();
}
I don't think it's worth doing the same for the runtime side since
that'll just increase text size, etc. (Or, I wasn't creative enough to
think of a way to distinguish them without doing so.)
I tried to figure out a way to use __same_type(q, (char *)0) to
trigger strncpy automatically and issuing a warning, but I couldn't
get it to work for some reason. It never tripped.
> +#if !defined(__NO_FORTIFY) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcpy(char *p, const char *q)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
> + return __builtin_strcpy(p, q);
> + if (strlcpy(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return p;
> +}
The other thing, which is cosmetic, would be to swap "p" and "q" for
"dst" and "src" everywhere, just to make these more readable.
The allyesconfig has tripped over a bunch of places where memcpy needs
to be strncpy. I'll send those patches in a bit...
-Kees
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncpy(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __builtin_strncpy(p, q, size);
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strcat(char *p, const char *q)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
> + return __builtin_strcat(p, q);
> + if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return p;
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE char *strncat(char *p, const char *q, __kernel_size_t count)
> +{
> + size_t p_len, copy_len;
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
> + return __builtin_strncat(p, q, count);
> + p_len = __builtin_strlen(p);
> + copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
> + if (p_size < p_len + copy_len + 1)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + __builtin_memcpy(p + p_len, q, copy_len);
> + p[p_len + copy_len] = '\0';
> + return p;
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
> +{
> + __kernel_size_t ret;
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
> + return __builtin_strlen(p);
> + ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
> + if (p_size <= ret)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +extern __kernel_size_t __real_strnlen(const char *, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(strnlen);
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char *p, __kernel_size_t maxlen)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + __kernel_size_t ret = __real_strnlen(p, maxlen < p_size ? maxlen : p_size);
> + if (p_size <= ret)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memset(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __builtin_memset(p, c, size);
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memcpy(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && (p_size < size || q_size < size))
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __builtin_memcpy(p, q, size);
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memmove(void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && (p_size < size || q_size < size))
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __builtin_memmove(p, q, size);
> +}
> +
> +extern void *__real_memscan(void *, int, __kernel_size_t) __RENAME(memscan);
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memscan(void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __real_memscan(p, c, size);
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE int memcmp(const void *p, const void *q, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && (p_size < size || q_size < size))
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size || q_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __builtin_memcmp(p, q, size);
> +}
> +
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr(const void *p, int c, __kernel_size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __builtin_memchr(p, c, size);
> +}
> +
> +void *__real_memchr_inv(const void *s, int c, size_t n) __RENAME(memchr_inv);
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *memchr_inv(const void *p, int c, size_t size)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __real_memchr_inv(p, c, size);
> +}
> +
> +extern void *__real_kmemdup(const void *src, size_t len, gfp_t gfp) __RENAME(kmemdup);
> +__FORTIFY_INLINE void *kmemdup(const void *p, size_t size, gfp_t gfp)
> +{
> + size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 0);
> + if (__builtin_constant_p(size) && p_size < size)
> + __buffer_overflow();
> + if (p_size < size)
> + fortify_panic(__func__);
> + return __real_kmemdup(p, size, gfp);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> #endif /* _LINUX_STRING_H_ */
> diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
> index b5c9a1168d3a..ca356e537e24 100644
> --- a/lib/string.c
> +++ b/lib/string.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
> * - Kissed strtok() goodbye
> */
>
> +#define __NO_FORTIFY
> +
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/string.h>
> #include <linux/ctype.h>
> @@ -952,3 +954,9 @@ char *strreplace(char *s, char old, char new)
> return s;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(strreplace);
> +
> +void fortify_panic(const char *name)
> +{
> + panic("detected buffer overflow in %s", name);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic);
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 93027fdf47d1..0e5035d720ce 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -154,6 +154,12 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
> been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
> trying to find such users.
>
> +config FORTIFY_SOURCE
> + bool "Harden common functions against buffer overflows"
> + help
> + Detect overflows of buffers in common functions where the compiler
> + can determine the buffer size.
> +
> config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
> bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
> help
> --
> 2.12.2
>
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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