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Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 23:58:13 -0500
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
Cc: jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
	jslaby@...e.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, jannh@...gle.com,
	keescook@...omium.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN

On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 11:45:26PM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> This patch reproduces GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY functionality from the grsecurity
> project in-kernel.
> 
> This will create the Kconfig SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT and the corresponding
> sysctl kernel.tiocsti_restrict that, when activated, restrict all TIOCSTI
> ioctl calls from non CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
> 
> Possible effects on userland:
> 
> There could be a few user programs that would be effected by this
> change.
> See: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=ioctl%5C%28.*TIOCSTI>
> notable programs are: agetty, csh, xemacs and tcsh
> 
> However, I still believe that this change is worth it given that the
> Kconfig defaults to n. This will be a feature that is turned on for the

It's not worthless, but note that for instance before this was fixed
in lxc, this patch would not have helped with escapes from privileged
containers.

> same reason that people activate it when using grsecurity. Users of this
> opt-in feature will realize that they are choosing security over some OS
> features like unprivileged TIOCSTI ioctls, as should be clear in the
> Kconfig help message.
> 
> Threat Model/Patch Rational:
> 
> >From grsecurity's config for GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY.
> 
>  | There are very few legitimate uses for this functionality and it
>  | has made vulnerabilities in several 'su'-like programs possible in
>  | the past.  Even without these vulnerabilities, it provides an
>  | attacker with an easy mechanism to move laterally among other
>  | processes within the same user's compromised session.
> 
> So if one process within a tty session becomes compromised it can follow
> that additional processes, that are thought to be in different security
> boundaries, can be compromised as a result. When using a program like su
> or sudo, these additional processes could be in a tty session where TTY file
> descriptors are indeed shared over privilege boundaries.
> 
> This is also an excellent writeup about the issue:
> <http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/TtyPushbackPrivilegeEscalation/>
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>
> ---
>  drivers/tty/tty_io.c |  4 ++++
>  include/linux/tty.h  |  2 ++
>  kernel/sysctl.c      | 12 ++++++++++++
>  security/Kconfig     | 13 +++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> index e6d1a65..31894e8 100644
> --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
> @@ -2296,11 +2296,15 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
>   *	FIXME: may race normal receive processing
>   */
>  
> +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
> +
>  static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
>  {
>  	char ch, mbz = 0;
>  	struct tty_ldisc *ld;
>  
> +	if (tiocsti_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +		return -EPERM;
>  	if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  	if (get_user(ch, p))
> diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
> index 1017e904..7011102 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tty.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tty.h
> @@ -342,6 +342,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
>  	struct list_head list;
>  };
>  
> +extern int tiocsti_restrict;
> +
>  /* tty magic number */
>  #define TTY_MAGIC		0x5401
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index acf0a5a..68d1363 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
>  #include <linux/kexec.h>
>  #include <linux/bpf.h>
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/tty.h>
>  
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <asm/processor.h>
> @@ -833,6 +834,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>  		.extra2		= &two,
>  	},
>  #endif
> +#if defined CONFIG_TTY
> +	{
> +		.procname	= "tiocsti_restrict",
> +		.data		= &tiocsti_restrict,
> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> +		.mode		= 0644,
> +		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
> +		.extra1		= &zero,
> +		.extra2		= &one,
> +	},
> +#endif
>  	{
>  		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
>  		.data		= &ngroups_max,
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 3ff1bf9..7d13331 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
>  
>  	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>  
> +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT

This is an odd way to name this.  Shouldn't the name reflect that it
is setting the default, rather than enabling the feature?

Besides that, I'm ok with the patch.

> +	bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
> +	  into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
> +	  ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> +
> +	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
> +	  unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
> +
> +	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> +
>  config SECURITY
>  	bool "Enable different security models"
>  	depends on SYSFS
> -- 
> 2.10.2

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