Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2017 15:12:11 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Kalle Valo <kvalo@...eaurora.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>, Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@...aro.org>, Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, Olof Johansson <olof@...om.net>, Chris Wilson <chris@...is-wilson.co.uk>, George Spelvin <linux@...encehorizons.net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, David Windsor <dwindsor@...il.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v2] bug: further enhance use of CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION This continues in applying the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION tests where appropriate, and pulling similar CONFIGs under the same check. Most notably, this adds the checks to refcount_t so that system builders can Oops their kernels when encountering a potential refcounter attack. (And so now the LKDTM tests for refcount issues pass correctly.) The series depends on the changes in -next made to lib/refcount.c, so it might be easiest if this goes through the locking tree... v2 is a rebase to -next and adjusts to using WARN_ONCE() instead of WARN(). -Kees v1 was here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/6/720
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