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Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2017 01:56:48 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@...wei.com>, Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
cgroups@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files
As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
the cgroup debug entries.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
struct task_struct *task;
int count = 0;
- seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset);
+ seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset);
list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) {
if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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