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Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 09:34:32 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/4] security: mark LSM hooks
as __ro_after_init
On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 8:26 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 02/13/2017 06:59 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 2:33 AM, Tetsuo Handa
>> <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
>>> James Morris wrote:
>>>> As the regsitration of LSMs is performed during init and then does
>>>> not change, we can mark all of the regsitration hooks as __ro_after_init.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
>>>
>>> This patch makes LKM based LSMs (e.g. AKARI) impossible.
>>> I'm not happy with this patch.
>>
>> LKM based LSMs don't exist yet, and when they do, we may also have the
>> "write rarely" infrastructure done, which LKM based LSMs can use to
>> update the structures.
>
> Is someone actually working on the write rarely patches? If a version
> has been sent out, I don't recall seeing it.
Still mostly just discussion. I've been toying with the PaX-style of
it on x86, and I think Mark Rutland had some ideas for arm64, but I
don't know if he's actually written code.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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