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Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 08:54:38 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@...el.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
David Windsor <dwindsor@...il.com>, Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@...il.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] refcount: Report failures through CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION
On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 12:57 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 05, 2017 at 03:33:36PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Sun, Feb 5, 2017 at 7:40 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
>> > On Fri, Feb 03, 2017 at 03:26:52PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> This converts from WARN_ON() to CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() in the
>> >> CONFIG_DEBUG_REFCOUNT case. Additionally moves refcount_t sanity check
>> >> conditionals into regular function flow. Since CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION()
>> >> is marked __much_check, we override few cases where the failure has
>> >> already been handled but we want to explicitly report it.
>> >>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>> >> ---
>> >> include/linux/refcount.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
>> >> lib/Kconfig.debug | 2 ++
>> >> 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>> >>
>> >> diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h
>> >> index 5b89cad62237..ef32910c7dd8 100644
>> >> --- a/include/linux/refcount.h
>> >> +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h
>> >> @@ -43,10 +43,10 @@
>> >> #include <linux/spinlock.h>
>> >>
>> >> #if CONFIG_DEBUG_REFCOUNT
>> >> -#define REFCOUNT_WARN(cond, str) WARN_ON(cond)
>> >> +#define REFCOUNT_CHECK(cond, str) CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(cond, str)
>> >
>> > OK, so that goes back to a full WARN() which will make the generated
>> > code gigantic due to the whole printk() trainwreck :/
>>
>> Hrm, perhaps we need three levels? WARN_ON, WARN, and BUG?
>
> Did consider that, didn't really know if that made sense.
>
> Like I wrote, ideally we'd end up using something like the x86 exception
> table with a custom handler. Just no idea how to pull that off without
> doing a full blown arch specific implementation, so I didn't go there
> quite yet.
I haven't spent much time looking at the extable stuff. (Though
coincidentally, I was poking at it for x86's test_nx stuff...) I
thought there was a way to build arch-agnostic extables already?
kernel/extable.c is unconditionally built-in, for example.
> That way refcount_inc() would end up being inlined to something like:
>
> mov 0x148(%rdi),%eax
> jmp 2f
> 1: lock cmpxchg %edx,0x148(%rdi)
> je 4f
> 2: lea -0x1(%rax),%ecx
> lea 0x1(%rax),%edx
> cmp $0xfffffffd,%ecx
> jbe 1b
> 3: ud2
> 4:
>
> _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(3b, 4b, ex_handler_refcount_inc)
>
>
> where:
>
> bool ex_handler_refcount_inc(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
> struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
> {
> regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
>
> if (!regs->ax)
> WARN(1, "refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.\n");
> else
> WARN(1, "refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.\n");
>
> return true;
> }
>
> and the handler is shared between all instances and can be as big and
> fancy as we'd like.
I'll dig a bit to see what I can build. Can you add the lkdtm tests to
the series, though? That should be fine as-is.
Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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