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Date: Sat, 4 Feb 2017 08:42:22 +0530
From: Kaiwan N Billimoria <kaiwan@...wantech.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: Merge in PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE work from grsec
to linux-next
>
>
> I think CONFIG_MEMORY_SANITIZE would enable:
>
> CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y
> CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y
> CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
>
> but it would _also_ need to set these kernel command-line variables as
> if they had been set:
>
> page_poison=1
> slub_debug=P
>
> Okay got it.
> > The new config now enables the CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE code (my prev
> > email patch), correct? (leaving out the stuff we cannot get without the
> > full grsec implementation).
>
> No, the first step would be for the config to only provide the above
> changes.
>
> Then, we'd want to add the poison value defaults as you mention:
>
> Right.
>
> And then finally add the exceptions for the "frequently freed" slub
> caches, as identified by PaX already. This would need the flag
> defined, the poisoning logic adjusted to check the flag, and for the
> new kernel command-line options for changing the whether or not the
> flag is respected (like PaX's "pax_sanitize_slab").
>
> Yup..
>
> In the discussions Laura had with the mm folks, the only realistic
> path to landing this in the upstream kernel is through these debug
> features.
>
> Hmm, ok.. naivete on my part :-)
> > Most folks would only use debug during development, if at all - given
> all the
> > concerns regarding performance. Here, the objective is to enable a
> powerful
> > security feature set. Hence, the config directives should come under the
> > 'Security Options' menu.
>
> We're not close to having a "Kernel Security" menu, so for now, I've
> wanted to focus on getting the features, and then making the Kconfig
> menus pretty later.
>
Yeah; I meant under the existing 'Security options' menu actually. But
still..
>
> Hopefully that all makes sense! :)
>
Indeed! Thanks very much..
-Kaiwan.
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Pixel Security
>
>
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