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Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2017 10:48:58 +0000
From: Mark Rutland <>
To: PaX Team <>
Cc:, Kees Cook <>,
	Emese Revfy <>,
	"AKASHI, Takahiro" <>,
	park jinbum <>,
	Daniel Micay <>,,
Subject: Re: [PATCH] gcc-plugins: Add structleak for more stack initialization

On Tue, Jan 17, 2017 at 07:54:38PM +0100, PaX Team wrote:
> On 17 Jan 2017 at 17:48, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > That being the case, (and given the relevant bug has now been fixed),
> > it's not clear to me what the value of this is today. i.e. given the
> > general case, is this preventing many leaks?
> no idea, i stopped looking at the instrumentation log long ago, but everyone
> can enable the debug output (has a very specific comment on it ;) and look at
> the results. i keep this plugin around because it costs nothing to maintain
> it and the alternative (better) solution doesn't exist yet.

Fair enough; understood.

> > > i never went into that direction because i think the security goal can
> > > be achieved without the performance impact of forced initialization.
> > 
> > Was there a particular technique you had in mind?
> sure, i mentioned it in my SSTIC'12 keynote (page 36):

Thanks for the pointer.

I'm probably being very naive here, but IIUC the per-task usercopy stack
would require roughly the same analysis to identify relevant variables,
unless all local variables (regardless of initialisation) that fed into
a usercopy would be on the usercopy stack?

Regardless, I can see the benefit of cleanly separating that data from
the rest of the kernel data.


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