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Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2017 10:35:37 -0800
From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, 
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Dave Hansen <dave@...1.net>, 
	Chen Yucong <slaoub@...il.com>, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>, 
	Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@...driver.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>, 
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>, Anna-Maria Gleixner <anna-maria@...utronix.de>, 
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>, Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>, 
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, 
	Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] x86/mm/KASLR: Remap GDTs at fixed location

On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 10:01 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 9:54 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jan 4, 2017 at 2:16 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> wrote:
>>>> Each processor holds a GDT in its per-cpu structure. The sgdt
>>>> instruction gives the base address of the current GDT. This address can
>>>> be used to bypass KASLR memory randomization. With another bug, an
>>>> attacker could target other per-cpu structures or deduce the base of the
>>>> main memory section (PAGE_OFFSET).
>>>>
>>>> In this change, a space is reserved at the end of the memory range
>>>> available for KASLR memory randomization. The space is big enough to hold
>>>> the maximum number of CPUs (as defined by setup_max_cpus). Each GDT is
>>>> mapped at specific offset based on the target CPU. Note that if there is
>>>> not enough space available, the GDTs are not remapped.
>>>
>>> Can we remap it read-only?  I.e. use PAGE_KERNEL_RO instead of
>>> PAGE_KERNEL.  After all, the ability to modify the GDT is instant
>>> root.
>>
>> That's my goal too. I started by doing a RO remap and got couple
>> problems with hibernation. I can try again for the next iteration or
>> delay it for another patch. I also need to look at KVM GDT usage, I am
>> not familiar with it yet.
>
> If you want a small adventure, I think a significant KVM-related
> performance improvement is available.  Specifically, on VMX exits, the
> GDT limit is hardwired to 0xffff (IIRC -- I could be remembering the
> actual vaue wrong).  KVM does LGDT to fix it.
>
> If we actually made the GDT have limit 0xffff (presumably by mapping
> the zero page a few times to pad it out without wasting memory), then
> we would avoid the LGDT.  LGDT is incredibly slow, so this would be a
> big win. Want to see if you can make this work with your patch set?

I can always take a look. If you have any prototype or more details,
feel free to send it to me on a separate thread.

-- 
Thomas

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