Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 14:34:00 +0100 (CET) From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> To: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> cc: NeilBrown <neilb@...e.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" On Fri, 16 Dec 2016, Greg KH wrote: > > You seem to be targeting a situation where the kernel memory can be > > easily changed, but filesystem content cannot (if it could - the > > attacker would simply replace /sbin/hotplug). > > Correct, like an embedded system with a read-only system partition, or > for when some kernel bug allows for random memory writes, yet privilege > escalation is hard to achieve for your process. Sorry, I really don't get this. If kernel memory can be easily changed (which is assumed here), why bother with all this? I'll just set current->uid to 0 and be done. -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.