Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 12:18:10 +0100 From: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@....com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, linux-x86_64@...r.kernel.org, vpk@...columbia.edu Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] Add support for eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) On 11/10/2016 08:24 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:45 AM, Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@....com> wrote: >> This patch adds support for XPFO which protects against 'ret2dir' kernel >> attacks. The basic idea is to enforce exclusive ownership of page frames >> by either the kernel or userspace, unless explicitly requested by the >> kernel. Whenever a page destined for userspace is allocated, it is >> unmapped from physmap (the kernel's page table). When such a page is >> reclaimed from userspace, it is mapped back to physmap. >> >> Additional fields in the page_ext struct are used for XPFO housekeeping. >> Specifically two flags to distinguish user vs. kernel pages and to tag >> unmapped pages and a reference counter to balance kmap/kunmap operations >> and a lock to serialize access to the XPFO fields. >> >> Known issues/limitations: >> - Only supports x86-64 (for now) >> - Only supports 4k pages (for now) >> - There are most likely some legitimate uses cases where the kernel needs >> to access userspace which need to be made XPFO-aware >> - Performance penalty >> >> Reference paper by the original patch authors: >> http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf > > Would it be possible to create an lkdtm test that can exercise this protection? I'll look into it. >> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig >> index 118f4549404e..4502e15c8419 100644 >> --- a/security/Kconfig >> +++ b/security/Kconfig >> @@ -6,6 +6,25 @@ menu "Security options" >> >> source security/keys/Kconfig >> >> +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_XPFO >> + bool > > Can you include a "help" section here to describe what requirements an > architecture needs to support XPFO? See HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER and > HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK or some examples. Will do. >> +config XPFO >> + bool "Enable eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)" >> + default n >> + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_XPFO >> + select PAGE_EXTENSION >> + help >> + This option offers protection against 'ret2dir' kernel attacks. >> + When enabled, every time a page frame is allocated to user space, it >> + is unmapped from the direct mapped RAM region in kernel space >> + (physmap). Similarly, when a page frame is freed/reclaimed, it is >> + mapped back to physmap. >> + >> + There is a slight performance impact when this option is enabled. >> + >> + If in doubt, say "N". >> + >> config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT >> bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" >> default n > > I've added these patches to my kspp tree on kernel.org, so it should > get some 0-day testing now... Very good. Thanks! > Thanks! Appreciate the feedback. ...Juerg > -Kees > Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (802 bytes)
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