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Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 15:19:23 -0400
From: Daniel Micay <>
Cc: Balbir Singh <>, LKML
 <>,  Rik van Riel <>, Casey
 Schaufler <>, PaX Team <>,  Brad
 Spengler <>, Russell King <>,
 Catalin Marinas <>, Will Deacon
 <>, Ard Biesheuvel <>, Benjamin
 Herrenschmidt <>,  Michael Ellerman
 <>, Tony Luck <>, Fenghua Yu
 <>, "David S. Miller" <>,
 "" <>, Christoph Lameter <>,  Pekka
 Enberg <>, David Rientjes <>, Joonsoo
 Kim <>,  Andrew Morton <>,
 Andy Lutomirski <>, Borislav Petkov <>,  Mathias
 Krause <>, Jan Kara <>, Vitaly Wool
 <>, Andrea Arcangeli <>, Dmitry
 Vyukov <>, Laura Abbott <>,
 "" <>, sparclinux
 <>,  linux-arch <>,
 Linux-MM <>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

> I'd like it to dump stack and be fatal to the process involved, but
> yeah, I guess BUG() would work. Creating an infrastructure for
> handling security-related Oopses can be done separately from this
> (and
> I'd like to see that added, since it's a nice bit of configurable
> reactivity to possible attacks).

In grsecurity, the oops handling also uses do_group_exit instead of
do_exit but both that change (or at least the option to do it) and the
exploit handling could be done separately from this without actually
needing special treatment for USERCOPY. Could expose is as something
like panic_on_oops=2 as a balance between the existing options.
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