Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2016 10:03:24 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@...el.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@...il.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, "linux-ia64@...r.kernel.org" <linux-ia64@...r.kernel.org>, linuxppc-dev <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>, sparclinux <sparclinux@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/9] mm: Hardened usercopy On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 1:25 AM, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org> wrote: > On 9 July 2016 at 04:22, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote: >> On 07/06/2016 03:25 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY. After I started >>> writing tests (now in lkdtm in -next) for Casey's earlier port, I >>> kept tweaking things further and further until I ended up with a whole >>> new patch series. To that end, I took Rik's feedback and made a number >>> of other changes and clean-ups as well. >>> >>> Based on my understanding, PAX_USERCOPY was designed to catch a few >>> classes of flaws around the use of copy_to_user()/copy_from_user(). These >>> changes don't touch get_user() and put_user(), since these operate on >>> constant sized lengths, and tend to be much less vulnerable. There >>> are effectively three distinct protections in the whole series, >>> each of which I've given a separate CONFIG, though this patch set is >>> only the first of the three intended protections. (Generally speaking, >>> PAX_USERCOPY covers what I'm calling CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY (this) and >>> CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_WHITELIST (future), and PAX_USERCOPY_SLABS covers >>> CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_SPLIT_KMALLOC (future).) >>> >>> This series, which adds CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, checks that objects >>> being copied to/from userspace meet certain criteria: >>> - if address is a heap object, the size must not exceed the object's >>> allocated size. (This will catch all kinds of heap overflow flaws.) >>> - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the >>> current stack frame (if such checking is possible) or at least entirely >>> within the current process's stack. (This could catch large lengths that >>> would have extended beyond the current process stack, or overflows if >>> their length extends back into the original stack.) >>> - if the address range is part of kernel data, rodata, or bss, allow it. >>> - if address range is page-allocated, that it doesn't span multiple >>> allocations. >>> - if address is within the kernel text, reject it. >>> - everything else is accepted >>> >>> The patches in the series are: >>> - The core copy_to/from_user() checks, without the slab object checks: >>> 1- mm: Hardened usercopy >>> - Per-arch enablement of the protection: >>> 2- x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy >>> 3- ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy >>> 4- arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy >>> 5- ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy >>> 6- powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy >>> 7- sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy >>> - The heap allocator implementation of object size checking: >>> 8- mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support >>> 9- mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support >>> >>> Some notes: >>> >>> - This is expected to apply on top of -next which contains fixes for the >>> position of _etext on both arm and arm64. >>> >>> - I couldn't detect a measurable performance change with these features >>> enabled. Kernel build times were unchanged, hackbench was unchanged, >>> etc. I think we could flip this to "on by default" at some point. >>> >>> - The SLOB support extracted from grsecurity seems entirely broken. I >>> have no idea what's going on there, I spent my time testing SLAB and >>> SLUB. Having someone else look at SLOB would be nice, but this series >>> doesn't depend on it. >>> >>> Additional features that would be nice, but aren't blocking this series: >>> >>> - Needs more architecture support for stack frame checking (only x86 now). >>> >>> >> >> Even with the SLUB fixup I'm still seeing this blow up on my arm64 system. >> This is a >> Fedora rawhide kernel + the patches >> >> [ 0.666700] usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from >> fffffc0008b4dd58 (<kernel text>) (8 bytes) >> [ 0.666720] CPU: 2 PID: 79 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W >> 4.7.0-0.rc6.git1.1.hardenedusercopy.fc25.aarch64 #1 >> [ 0.666733] Hardware name: AppliedMicro Mustang/Mustang, BIOS 1.1.0 Nov 24 >> 2015 >> [ 0.666744] Call trace: >> [ 0.666756] [<fffffc0008088a20>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e8 >> [ 0.666765] [<fffffc0008088c2c>] show_stack+0x24/0x30 >> [ 0.666775] [<fffffc0008455344>] dump_stack+0xa4/0xe0 >> [ 0.666785] [<fffffc000828d874>] __check_object_size+0x6c/0x230 >> [ 0.666795] [<fffffc00083a5748>] create_elf_tables+0x74/0x420 >> [ 0.666805] [<fffffc00082fb1f0>] load_elf_binary+0x828/0xb70 >> [ 0.666814] [<fffffc0008298b4c>] search_binary_handler+0xb4/0x240 >> [ 0.666823] [<fffffc0008299864>] do_execveat_common+0x63c/0x950 >> [ 0.666832] [<fffffc0008299bb4>] do_execve+0x3c/0x50 >> [ 0.666841] [<fffffc00080e3720>] call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0xe8/0x148 >> [ 0.666850] [<fffffc0008084a80>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50 >> >> This happens on every call to execve. This seems to be the first >> copy_to_user in >> create_elf_tables. I didn't get a chance to debug and I'm going out of town >> all of next week so all I have is the report unfortunately. config attached. >> > > This is a known issue, and a fix is already queued for v4.8 in the arm64 tree: > > 9fdc14c55c arm64: mm: fix location of _etext  > > which moves _etext up in the linker script so that it does not cover .rodata Oops, I missed this reply, sorry for the redundant answer. :) > ARM was suffering from the same problem, and Kees proposed a fix for > it. I don't know what the status of that patch is, though. This is also in -next "ARM: 8583/1: mm: fix location of _etext". > Note that on arm64, we have > > #define ELF_PLATFORM ("aarch64") > > which explains why k_platform points into .rodata in this case. On > ARM, it points to a writable string (as the code quoted by Rik shows), > so there it will likely explode elsewhere without the linker script > fix. > >  https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git/commit/?h=for-next/core&id=9fdc14c55c -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.