Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 13:33:15 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at> Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 12:15 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: > On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 2:54 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at> wrote: >> Am 24.11.2015 um 20:19 schrieb Kees Cook: >>> Hi, >>> >>> While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still >>> something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status >>> here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had >>> someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's >>> not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with? >> >> I can revive my patch and resend. Maybe it helps to collect >> new ideas (or NAKs ;)). > > That would be great. Start by sending the series to kernel-hardening. > We can comment on it before you send a version to lkml. (i.e. try to > avoid NAKs...) :) Hi! Any updates on this? I think with the latest userspace ASLR improvements from Android, this is becoming a more urgently needed features. :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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