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Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 21:52:00 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, lasse.collin@...aani.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/20] x86, boot: kaslr cleanup and 64bit kaslr support
On Thu, Apr 14, 2016 at 9:08 PM, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 04/14/16 at 10:56am, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Thu, Apr 14, 2016 at 8:06 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > On 04/13/16 at 11:02pm, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 7:11 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>> FWIW, I've also had this tree up in my git branches, and the 0day
>> >> >>> tester hasn't complained at all about it in the last two weeks. I'd
>> >> >>> really like to see this in -next to fix the >4G (mainly kexec) issues
>> >> >>> and get us to feature parity with the arm64 kASLR work (randomized
>> >> >>> virtual address).
>> >>
>> >> So, I've done this and suddenly realized I hadn't boot-tested i386. It
>> >> doesn't work, unfortunately. (Which I find strange: I'd expect 0day to
>> >> have noticed...)
>> >>
>> >> Baoquan, have you tested this on 32-bit systems? I get a variety of
>> >> failures. Either it boots okay, it reboots, or I get tons of pte
>> >> errors like this:
>> >
>> > Hi Kees,
>> >
>> > I am sorry I didn't notice the change impacts i386. I got a i386 machine
>> > and had tests. Found i386 can't take separate randomzation since there's
>> > difference between i386 and x86_64.
>> >
>> > x86_64 has phys_base and can translate virt addr and phys addr according
>> > to below formula:
>> >
>> > paddr = vaddr - __START_KERNEL_map + phys_base;
>> >
>> > However i386 can only do like this:
>> >
>> > paddr = vaddr - PAGE_OFFSET;
>> >
>> > Besides i386 has to reserve 128M for VMALLOC at the end of kernel
>> > virtual address. So for i386 area 768M is the upper limit for
>> > randomization. But I am fine with the KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE, the old default
>> > value. What do you say about this?
>> >
>> > So the plan should be keeping the old style of randomization for i386
>> > system:
>> >
>> > 1) Disable virtual address randomization in i386 case because it's
>> > useless. This should be done in patch:
>> > x86, KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately
>> >
>> > 2) Add an upper limit for physical randomization if it's i386 system.
>> > x86, KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G
>> >
>> > I just got a test machine in office, and haven't had time to change
>> > code. You can change it directly, or I will do it tomorrow.
>>
>> I was thinking about the physical vs virtual on i386 as I woke up
>> today. :) Thanks for confirming! These changes appear to make the
>> series boot reliably on i386 (pardon any gmail-induced whitespace
>> damage...):
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
>> index 5bae54b50d4c..3a58fe8acb8e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/aslr.c
>> @@ -347,6 +347,10 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
>> if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
>> return;
>>
>> + /* On 32-bit, ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
>> + return;
>> +
>> /* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */
>> if (entry->addr + entry->size < minimum)
>> return;
>> @@ -372,6 +376,11 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry,
>> /* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
>> region.size -= region.start - start_orig;
>>
>> + /* On 32-bit, reduce region size to fit within max size. */
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) &&
>> + region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
>> + region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start;
>> +
>> /* Return if region can't contain decompressed kernel */
>> if (region.size < image_size)
>> return;
>> @@ -488,6 +497,8 @@ void choose_kernel_location(unsigned char *input,
>> }
>>
>> /* Pick random virtual address starting from LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. */
>> - random = find_random_virt_offset(LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, output_size);
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
>> + random = find_random_virt_offset(LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR,
>> + output_size);
>> *virt_offset = (unsigned char *)random;
>> }
>>
>>
>> I will split these chunks up into the correct patches and resend the
>> series. If you get a chance, can you double-check this?
>
> Yes, these changes sounds great. I checked the series you posted, and
> have to say you make them look much better. The change logs are perfect
> and great code refactoring. Just one little bit thing, here:
>
> [kees: rewrote changelog, refactored goto into while, limit 32-bit to 1G]
> in patch [PATCH v5 19/21] x86, KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G
>
> In i386 KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE is kept to be 0x20000000, namely 512M, w/o kaslr
> enabled. So here I guess it's a typo, should be "limit 32-bit to 1G". And
> what I said is wrong about upper limit yesterday, in fact i386 can put kernel
> in [16M, 896M), not 768M. But KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE is good enough for i386 for
> now.
Ah yeah, thanks. If we do a v6, I'll update the typo. I was going to
say "limit 32-bit to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE" but it was going to line-wrap.
:P
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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