[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sat, 9 Apr 2016 07:08:30 -0700
From: lazytyped <lazytyped@...il.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2] mm: SLAB freelist randomization
On 4/8/16 11:03 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> For example this attack against SLUB (also applicable against SLAB)
> would be affected:
> https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/09/10/linux-kernel-can-slub-overflow/
would it?
- allocate a ton of shmid_kernel until you get a fresh page
- free one of such objects (here is where your randomization comes into
play)
- allocate the "vulnerable" object
- trigger the overflow
- start "freeing" the others - one will work
This doesn't work only in the case in which you are the last object in
the SLUB. So what you are achieving is a 1/(pagesize/sizeof_objects)
chance of making the attack less reliable. But I can free yet another
object and retry, if the previous overflow didn't kill me (simplest way
to guarantee that is to not completely fill the newly allocated SLUB page).
- twiz
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
