[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2016 16:12:46 -0400
From: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
To: Scott Bauer <sbauer@....utah.edu>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, wmealing@...hat.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Abhiram Balasubramanian <abhiram@...utah.edu>, Scott Bauer <sbauer@...donthack.me>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] Documentation: SROP Mitigation: Add documentation
for SROP cookies
On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 3:53 PM, Scott Bauer <sbauer@....utah.edu> wrote:
> This patch adds documentation and test code for SROP mitigation.
>
> Cc: Abhiram Balasubramanian <abhiram@...utah.edu>
> Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@...donthack.me>
> Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@....utah.edu>
> ---
> Documentation/security/srop-cookies.txt | 203 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 203 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/security/srop-cookies.txt
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/srop-cookies.txt b/Documentation/security/srop-cookies.txt
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..ee17181
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/security/srop-cookies.txt
> @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
> + Sigreturn-oriented programming and its mitigation
> +
> +
> +A good write up can be found here: https://lwn.net/Articles/676803/
> +It covers much of what is outlined in this documentation.
> +
> +If you're very curious you should read the SROP paper:
> +http://www.cs.vu.nl/~herbertb/papers/srop_sp14.pdf
> +
> +If you're here to learn how to disable SROP issue the following
> +Command:
> +
> +# echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/disable-srop-protection
> +
> +
> +============================ Overview ============================
> +
> +Sigreturn-oriented programming(SROP) is a new technique to control
> +a compromised userland process after successfully exploiting a bug.
> +
> +Signals are delivered to the process during context switches. The
> +kernel will setup a signal frame on the process' stack which
> +contains the saved state of the process prior to the context switch.
> +The kernel then gives control the the process' signal handler. Once
> +the process has delt with the signal it will call the sigreturn
> +system call. During the context switch into the kernel, the previous
> +state of where the process was executing prior to the delivery of
> +the signal is overwritten, hence why the kernel must save the the
> +state in a signal frame on the user's stack. The kernel will remove
> +the signal frame from the process' stack and continue execution
> +where the process left off.
> +
> +The issue with this signal delivery method is if an attacker can
> +construct a fake signal frame on the compromised process' stack
> +and ROP into the sigreturn system call, they have the ability to
> +easily control the flow of execution by having the kernel return
> +execution to wherever the signal frame says to continue execution.
> +
> +More importantly, SROP makes an attackers job easier. Previously
> +attackers would have to search for ROP gadgets to get values into
> +registers then call mprotect or mmap to get some memory where they
> +could copy and execute shellcode. If the ROP gadgets didnt exist
> +that allowed setting up a call to those functions then the attackers
> +wouldn't be able to fully exploit the bug. With SROP however attackers
> +dont' have to search for ROP gadgets to get specific values into
> +registers. The attacker would simply lay out the ucontext on the stack
> +as they choose then SROP into the mprotect or mmap call.
> +
> +======================== Mitigating SROP ========================
> +
> +In order to prevent SROP the kernel must remember or be able to derive
> +at runtime whether a sigreturn call it is currently processing is
> +in respose to a legitimate signal delivered by the kernel.
> +
> +During delivery of a signal the kernel will place the signal frame
> +with the saved process state on the stack. It will also place a cookie
> +above the signal frame.
> +
> +The cookie is a per-process secret xor'd with the address where it will
> +be stored. During a sigreturn the kernel will extract this cookie, and
> +then compare the extracted cookie against a new generated cookie:
> +(the per process secret xord with address where we extracted cookie from).
> +
> +If the two cookies match, then the kernel has verified that it is handling
> +a sigreturn from a signal that was previously legitimately delivered.
> +If the cookies do not match up the kernel sends a SIGSEGV to the process,
> +terminating it.
> +
> +After verifying the cookie, the kernel will zero out the cookie to prevent
> +any sort of leaking of the cookie.
> +
> +This prevents SROP because it forces an attacker to know the cookie in order
> +to use SROP as an attack vector.
> +
> +
> +======================== Possible Issues ========================
> +SROP protection will probably break any process or application which do
> +some sort of checkpoint-restore in user space type things. As well as DOSEMU.
> +
> +
> +
> +===============================================================================
> +Inlined are two programs that exploit SROP:
> +
> +For 32bit:
> +
> +Compile with if you're using a 64bit kernel:
> +gcc -O0 -o srop_32 srop_32.c -g -fno-stack-protector -ffixed-ebp -ffixed-esp -m32 -DEMULATED_32
> +
> +or if you're already on a real 32bit kernel:
> +gcc -O0 -o srop_32 srop_32.c -g -fno-stack-protector -ffixed-ebp -ffixed-esp
> +
> +When run without SROP protection it will exit gracefully, when SROP is
> +enabled it will terminate with a SIGSEGV.
> +
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +
> +void syscall(void)
> +{
> + exit(1);
> +}
> +
> +void test2(void)
> +{
> + register int esp asm("esp");
> + register int ebp asm("ebp");
> + struct sigcontext scon = { 0 };
> +
> + scon.eax = 11;
> + scon.ebx = 0x41;
> + scon.ecx = 0;
> + scon.edx = 0;
> + scon.esp = scon.ebp = ebp;
> + scon.eip = (int)syscall+6;
> +
> +#if defined EMULATED_32
> + scon.fs = 0x00;
> + scon.cs = 0x23;
> + scon.ss = scon.ds = scon.es = 0x2B;
> + scon.gs = 0x63;
> +#else
> + scon.fs = 0x00;
> + scon.cs = 0x73;
> + scon.ss = scon.ds = scon.es = 0x7B;
> + scon.gs = 0x33;
> +#endif
> + esp = (int) &scon;
> + asm("movl $119, %eax\n");//NR_SIGRETURN;
> + asm("int $0x80\n");
> +}
> +
> +int main(void)
> +{
> + test2();
> + return 1;
> +}
> +
> +=====================================================
> +
> +
> +For 64 bit:
> +
> +gcc -O0 -o srop srop.c -g -fno-stack-protector -ffixed-rsp -ffixed-rbp
> +When run the program exits normally, with SROP protetction it terminates
> +with a segmentationf fault.
> +
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <signal.h>
> +
> +enum {
> + REG_R8 = 0,
> + REG_R9,
> + REG_R10,
> + REG_R11,
> + REG_R12,
> + REG_R13,
> + REG_R14,
> + REG_R15,
> + REG_RDI,
> + REG_RSI,
> + REG_RBP,
> + REG_RBX,
> + REG_RDX,
> + REG_RAX,
> + REG_RCX,
> + REG_RSP,
> + REG_RIP,
> + REG_EFL,
> + REG_CSGSFS,/* Actually short cs, gs, fs, __pad0. */
> + REG_ERR,
> + REG_TRAPNO,
> + REG_OLDMASK,
> + REG_CR2
> +};
> +
> +void _exit_(void)
> +{
> + exit(1);
> +}
> +
> +void test(void)
> +{
> + struct ucontext ctx = { 0 };
> + register unsigned long rsp asm("rsp");
> + register unsigned long rbp asm("rbp");
> + ctx.uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP] = (unsigned long) _exit_ + 4;
> + ctx.uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RSP] = rsp;
> + ctx.uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RBP] = rbp;
> + ctx.uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_CSGSFS] = 0x002b000000000033;
> + rsp = (unsigned long) &ctx;
> + asm("movq $0xf,%rax\n");
> + asm("syscall\n");
> +}
> +
> +
> +int main(void)
> +{
> + test();
> + return 0;
> +}
> --
> 1.9.1
>
These test programs should go in tools/testing/selftests/x86.
--
Brian Gerst
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
