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Message-Id: <1458788042-26173-3-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net>
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 03:53:56 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk@...7.org>,
Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [RFC v1 11/17] selftest/seccomp: Add argeval_open_whitelist test
Test a basic sandbox adding a checker group and using it for path
filtering.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
---
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 114 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 8b1a6bfc64a1..49c5d39c30a4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -2237,6 +2237,120 @@ TEST(field_is_valid_syscall)
EXPECT_EQ(-1, syscall(__NR_getpid));
EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
}
+
+#define PATH_DEV_NULL "/dev/null"
+#define PATH_DEV_ZERO "/dev/zero"
+
+/* The sandbox0 allow opening only @allowed_path */
+void apply_sandbox0(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, const char *allowed_path)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter0[] = {
+ /* Only care about open(2) */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, __NR_open, 0, 1),
+ /* Check the objects of group 5 matching the first argument */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ARGEVAL | 1 << 8 | 5),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog0 = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter0),
+ .filter = filter0,
+ };
+ struct sock_filter filter1[] = {
+ /* Does not need to check for arch nor syscall number because
+ * of the @checker_group check
+ */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, checker_group)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, 5, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ /* Kill if not a valid syscall (unknown open‽) */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, is_valid_syscall)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JEQ|BPF_K, 1, 1, 0),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
+ /* Denied access if the first argument was not validated by the
+ * checker.
+ */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD|BPF_W|BPF_ABS, match_arg(0)),
+ /* Match the first two checkers, if any */
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP|BPF_JSET|BPF_K, 3, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ /* Use an impossible errno value to ensure it comes from our
+ * filter (should be EACCES most of the time).
+ */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | E2BIG),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog1 = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter1),
+ .filter = filter1,
+ };
+ struct seccomp_object_path path0 = SECCOMP_MAKE_PATH_DENTRY(allowed_path);
+ struct seccomp_checker checker0[] = {
+ SECCOMP_MAKE_OBJ_PATH(FS_LITERAL, &path0),
+ };
+ /* Group 5 */
+ struct seccomp_checker_group checker_group0 = {
+ .version = 1,
+ .id = 5,
+ .len = ARRAY_SIZE(checker0),
+ .checkers = &checker0,
+ };
+
+ /* Set up the test sandbox */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
+ }
+ /* Load the path checkers */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_ADD_CHECKER_GROUP, 0, &checker_group0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to add checker group!");
+ }
+ /* Load filters in reverse order */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog1)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to install filter!");
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC, &prog0)) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to install filter!");
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(argeval_open_whitelist)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ /* Validate the first test file */
+ fd = open(PATH_DEV_ZERO, O_RDONLY);
+ EXPECT_NE(-1, fd) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open " PATH_DEV_ZERO);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* Validate the second test file */
+ fd = open(PATH_DEV_NULL, O_RDONLY);
+ EXPECT_NE(-1, fd) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open " PATH_DEV_NULL);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ apply_sandbox0(_metadata, PATH_DEV_ZERO);
+
+ /* Allowed file */
+ fd = open(PATH_DEV_ZERO, O_RDONLY);
+ EXPECT_NE(-1, fd) {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to open " PATH_DEV_ZERO);
+ }
+ close(fd);
+
+ /* Denied file (by the filter) */
+ fd = open(PATH_DEV_NULL, O_RDONLY);
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, fd) {
+ TH_LOG("Could open " PATH_DEV_NULL);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(E2BIG, errno);
+ close(fd);
+}
#endif /* SECCOMP_DATA_ARGEVAL_PRESENT */
/*
--
2.8.0.rc3
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