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Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 08:03:44 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>, 
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, 
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test

On Thu, Feb 25, 2016 at 3:15 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 02/25/2016 09:35 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Ah-ha, yes, that was one of the missing pieces:
>>
>> [   10.790970] lkdtm: Performing direct entry READ_AFTER_FREE
>> [   10.790992] lkdtm: Value in memory before free: 12345678
>> [   10.790996] lkdtm: Attempting bad read from freed memory
>> [   10.790998] lkdtm: Memory correctly poisoned, calling BUG
>> [   10.791067] ------------[ cut here ]------------
>> [   10.792037] kernel BUG at drivers/misc/lkdtm.c:465!
>>
>> I see that "F" is also needed to do the sanity checks, but the poison
>> ends up being different again from what I was expected:
>>
>> [    8.643902] lkdtm: Performing direct entry WRITE_AFTER_FREE
>> [    8.645215] lkdtm: Allocated memory ffff88007b446850-ffff88007b446c50
>> [    8.646700] lkdtm: Attempting bad write to freed memory at
>> ffff88007b446a50
>> [    8.648295]
>> =============================================================================
>> [    8.649275] BUG kmalloc-1024 (Tainted: G      D        ): Poison
>> overwritten
>> [    8.649275]
>> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> [    8.649275]
>> [    8.649275] INFO: 0xffff88007b446a50-0xffff88007b446a53. First byte
>> 0xf0 instead of 0x6b
>>
>> 0x6b is POISON_FREE:
>>
>> #define POISON_INUSE    0x5a    /* for use-uninitialised poisoning */
>> #define POISON_FREE     0x6b    /* for use-after-free poisoning */
>> #define POISON_END      0xa5    /* end-byte of poisoning */
>>
>
> Yep, 0x6b is a magic number I've seen all too frequently before ;)
>
> The current poisoning with slub_debug=P covers multiple cases. On
> alloc, the memory is set with POISON_INUSE to catch uninitailized
> usage. on free, the memory is set to POISON_FREE To catch use after
> free bugs. The last bit POISON_END is set at the end of the block
> to catch users who might run off the end of the buffer. Having the
> different values makes it easier to determine which bug it is.
>
>>
>> So it seems like there are separate poisonings going on? Modifying
>> READ_AFTER_FREE a bit more, I see that it looks like only the buddy
>> allocator is getting the zero poisoning?
>>
>
> Yes. The buddy allocator and SL*B allocators are two separate pieces
> of code which need independent poisoning mechanisms. Currently, only
> the buddy allocator has the zero poisoning. The same functionality
> can be added to SL*B allocator as well if it seems beneficial.

My concerns are with the performance characteristics, mostly. To match
PAX_MEMORY_SANITIZE, zero poisoning almost everything should get us
into the 3% range, I'm hoping.

>> [   61.755450] lkdtm: Performing direct entry READ_AFTER_FREE
>> [   61.757436] lkdtm: Value in memory before free: 12345678
>> [   61.759390] lkdtm: Attempting bad read from freed memory
>> [   61.761649] lkdtm: Memory correctly poisoned (6b6b6b6b)
>>
>> [   62.139408] lkdtm: Performing direct entry READ_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE
>> [   62.140766] lkdtm: Value in memory before free: 12345678
>> [   62.141989] lkdtm: Attempting to read from freed memory
>> [   62.143225] lkdtm: Memory correctly poisoned (0)
>>
>> Once this series is in, we need to find a way to make a single CONFIG
>> to be more friendly than needing to add "page_poison=on slub_debug=FP"
>> to the command line. :)
>
> Yep. We can probably use CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON as an example of what to
> do.
>
> On a side note, what's your opinion on the necessity of 'F' for the
> checks? 'P' by itself will ensure the memory is cleared. The sanity
> checks had a notable imapct on performance.

Ah, no, that's just for completeness of testing. The sanity checks
appear to add about 3% additional overhead, but poisoning seems to add
about 9%. :(

DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n
PAGE_POISONING=y
PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y

Run times: 389.23 384.88 386.33
Mean: 386.81
Std Dev: 1.81

LKDTM detects nothing, as expected.


DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n
PAGE_POISONING=y
PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=n
slub_debug=P page_poison=on

Run times: 435.63 419.20 422.82
Mean: 425.89
Std Dev: 7.05

Overhead: 9.2% vs all disabled

Poisoning confirmed: READ_AFTER_FREE, READ_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE
Writes not detected, as expected.


DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n
PAGE_POISONING=y
PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y
slub_debug=P page_poison=on

Run times: 423.44 422.32 424.95
Mean: 423.57
Std Dev: 1.08

Overhead 8.7% overhead vs disabled, 0.5% improvement over non-zero
poison (though only the buddy allocator is using the zero poison).

Poisoning confirmed: READ_AFTER_FREE, READ_BUDDY_AFTER_FREE
Writes not detected, as expected.


DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n
PAGE_POISONING=y
PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=n
PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y
slub_debug=FP page_poison=on

Run times: 454.26 429.46 430.48
Mean: 438.07
Std Dev: 11.46

Overhead: 11.7% vs nothing, 3% more overhead than no sanitizing.

All four tests detect correctly.


-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

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