Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 11:09:06 -0800 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 8/8] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: > The vDSO does not need to be writable after __init, so mark it as > __ro_after_init. The result kills the exploit method of writing to the > vDSO from kernel space resulting in userspace executing the modified code, > as shown here to bypass SMEP restrictions: http://itszn.com/blog/?p=21 > > The memory map (with added vDSO address reporting) shows the vDSO moving > into read-only memory: Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
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