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Message-Id: <1450364270-12687-8-git-send-email-dave@progbits.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 09:57:45 -0500
From: David Windsor <dave@...gbits.org>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: David Windsor <dave@...gbits.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 07/12] security: opt out of PAX_REFCOUNT protection
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@...gbits.org>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/avc.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 2 +-
6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e2a60c3..2e41dd3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ int ima_init_template(void);
extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
struct ima_h_table {
- atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
- atomic_long_t violations;
+ atomic_long_unchecked_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
+ atomic_long_unchecked_t violations;
struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
};
extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 1d950fb..a8f4eab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
int result;
/* can overflow, only indicator */
- atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
+ atomic_long_inc_unchecked(&ima_htable.violations);
result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
if (result < 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 816d175..20079ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@
static int valid_policy = 1;
#define TMPBUFLEN 12
static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
- loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
+ loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_unchecked_t *val)
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t len;
- len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
+ len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read_unchecked(val));
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 552705d..9920f4fb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later);
list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
- atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len);
+ atomic_long_inc_unchecked(&ima_htable.len);
key = ima_hash_key(entry->digest);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]);
return 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 0b122b1..d9f9568 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct avc_node {
struct avc_cache {
struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
- atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
+ atomic_unchecked_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
atomic_t active_nodes;
u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */
};
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
}
atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
- atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+ atomic_set_unchecked(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
spinlock_t *lock;
for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
- hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+ hvalue = atomic_inc_return_unchecked(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 1450f85..a91e0bc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
rtnl_lock();
for_each_net(net) {
- atomic_inc(&net->xfrm.flow_cache_genid);
+ atomic_inc_unchecked(&net->xfrm.flow_cache_genid);
rt_genid_bump_all(net);
}
rtnl_unlock();
--
2.5.0
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