Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2015 13:38:32 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the attack surface. Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro() which happens after all kernel __init code has finished. This introduces __read_only as a way to mark such memory, and uses it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. -Kees
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