Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 14:41:33 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 6:23 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote: > On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 03:17:08PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> >> Exactly. Hence the NAK. > But Having two LSM Hooks there is really not practical! It'd doable *if* it turns out that it's the right solution. But revoke seems much more likely to be simple, comprehensible, and obviously correct to me. --Andy > > Note to mention some of these redundancy checks... > >> > >> > Is there some mechanism to check what you describe? >> > >> >> No. You could try to add one, but getting it to be compatible with >> YAMA might be really messy. > LSM is limitted in this situation, and it can't work with YAMA, or > perhaps YAMA will just return -EPERM > > So this LSM protections are currently vulnerable too! > > >> Or you could see if destroying and recreating all the inodes on exec >> or some other revoke-like approach would work. >> >> --Andy > > -- > Djalal Harouni > http://opendz.org -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC
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