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Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 19:34:08 +0100
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, 
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, 
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's
 opener may access task

On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 7:23 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 04, 2013 at 04:40:01PM +0100, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 9:59 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 02:09:55PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
>> >> > On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 12:37:49PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> >> On Thu, Oct 3, 2013 at 12:29 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
>> > The current patches block and protect the current attacks correctly,
>> > without overhead.
>> >
>> > Example:
>> > proc_uid_map_write()
>> >  -> map_write()
>> >    -> file_ns_capable()
>> >       -> security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap)
>> >
>> > file_ns_capable() added in commit 935d8aabd4331 by Linus
>> > Add file_ns_capable() helper function for open-time capability checking
>> >
>> > That also goes for commit 6708075f104c3c9b0 by Eric,
>> > userns: Don't let unprivileged users trick privileged users into setting
>> > the id_map
>> >
>> > The proc_allow_access() function that I've proposed has the same logic
>> > of file_ns_capable(), We can even put file_ns_capable() inside
>> > proc_allow_access(). We'll add support of security_capable_noaudit()
>> > inside file_ns_capable() and proc_allow_access() will be much more
>> > better.
>> >
>> > file_ns_capable() checks where a capability was there,
>> > proc_allow_access() checks where they have same uid + if capability was
>> > there.
>> >
>> >> please either fix it, stop using f_cred, or explain why it it's okay
>> >> despite not invoking LSM in the expected way.
>> > I've already explained it.
>> >
>> > LSM is handled by ptrace_may_access() which should be called during
>> > ->open() to handle f_cred, and during ->read() to handle current's cred.
>>
>> This is getting tiresome.  This patch (2/9) has my NAK.  The other
>> patches depend on it, so I will not ack them.  (The maintainers may or
>> may not care about my NAK -- that's their business.)
> Yeh tiresome, especially for fixing some leaks that affect the kernel
> and ASLR for a long time now...
>
> Ok response below:
>
>> Your code is *wrong* for even the simple case of /proc/*/syscall.  Consider:
>>
>> Start with two processes, a and b, both normal tasks started by an
>> unprivileged user.  Process a opens /proc/<b's pid>/syscall.  All
>> checks pass.  Process b execs a setcap'd binary.  So b's uid and gid
>> do not change.
>>
>> Then process a redirects stdin to that existing /proc/<b's pid>/stack
> You mean /proc/<b's pid>/syscall, ok let see
>
>> fd.  Here's the bug in your patch: process a can *still* read that fd.
>>  Why?  Because *you're not checking that a's capabilities are a
>> superset of b's*.  That code lives in the LSM infrastructure.  You
> Please see with me:

Sorry, I described the obviously broken scenario incorrectly.  Your
patch breaks (in the absence of things like selinux) if a exec
something setuid root.

[...]

>
> I did the check in the proc_same_open_cred() function:
>  return (uid_eq(fcred->uid, cred->uid) &&
>          gid_eq(fcred->gid, cred->gid) &&
>          cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, fcred->cap_permitted));

Which has nothing to do with anything.  If that check fails, you're
just going on to a different, WRONG check/.

>
> Check if this is the same uid/gid and the capabilities superset!
>
> But in the proc_allow_access() the capabilities superset is missing.
>
>
> So to fix it:
> 1) if proc_same_open_cred() detects that cred have changed between
> ->open() and ->read() then abort, return zero, the ->read(),write()...

IMO yuck.

>
>
> 2) Improve the proc_allow_access() check by:
>    if this is the same user namespace then check uid/gid of f_cred on
>    target cred task, and the capabilities superset:
>    cap_issubset(tcred->cap_permitted, fcred->cap_permitted));
>
>    If it fails let security_capable() or file_ns_capable() do its magic.
>

NAK.  You need to actually call the LSM.  What if the reason to fail
the request isn't that the writer gained capabilities -- what if the
writer's selinux label changed?

>
>
> The capabilities superset check are available, they are not LSM
> specific.

NO.  This is getting ridiculous.  You can't just re-implement what the
commoncap code does because you don't want to call the LSM hook.  You
need to call the LSM hook.

>
>> need to call it if you want to keep the general approach you're
>> trying.  You can't fix this just by checking for CAP_PTRACE, because
>> then you'll break SELinux.
> IIUC, then SELinux is already broken!
>
> You do you realize that these patches are adding a bench of
> ptrace_may_access() during ->open() to give LSM a chance to inspect
> f_cred and other things.

Yes.  But they're messy, they open-code incorrect checks, and they are
sufficiently incomplete as fixes for the vulnerability that you're
better off not doing them, because they'll just muddy the waters.

--Andy

>
>
>> This is messy, and it's why I think that you'd be better off doing
>> this by revoking the fd on exec instead.
> As I've said I'm not against revoke. If it was there I would use it!
>
> Not implemented! and perhaps it will be complex...
>
>
> Please respond, and perhaps you should reconsider your NAK! since you
> were involved in the patches that were committed, and used the
> file->f_cred approach

Yes, I was.  That particular thing is fine, because there's no LSM
hook involved in the first case.  If anyone ever adds one, they'll
have to invoke it in the appropriate places.

--Andy

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