Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
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Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 16:08:06 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, 
	Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, 
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, 
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, 
	David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's
 opener may access task

On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 3:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>
> I'd really like a solution where there are no read or write
> implementations in the entire kernel that check permissions.  Failing
> that, just getting it for procfs would be nice.  (uid_map, etc will
> probably need to be revoked on unshare for this to work.)

By "check permissions" I mean using anything but f_cred.

uid_map won't need any form of revoke, though -- the stuct file
already points at a particular target ns.  I wonder why the
CAP_SYS_ADMIN check is in map_write instead of open, though.

--Andy

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