Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2013 16:08:06 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> Cc: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task On Fri, Oct 4, 2013 at 3:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: > > I'd really like a solution where there are no read or write > implementations in the entire kernel that check permissions. Failing > that, just getting it for procfs would be nice. (uid_map, etc will > probably need to be revoked on unshare for this to work.) By "check permissions" I mean using anything but f_cred. uid_map won't need any form of revoke, though -- the stuct file already points at a particular target ns. I wonder why the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check is in map_write instead of open, though. --Andy
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