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Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 22:30:58 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <>
To: Ingo Molnar <>
CC: Kees Cook <>,,,,, Eric Northup <>,,,
        Mathias Krause <>,
        Zhang Yanfei <>,
        Linus Torvalds <>,
        Andrew Morton <>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <>,
        Peter Zijlstra <>,
        Thomas Gleixner <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization

On 10/01/2013 10:25 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> I mean, for example in an oops message we print data in words: the RIP, 
> other registers and stack contents. If any of these values lies within the 
> randomization range then we could de-randomize it.
> So instead of exposing randomized values, we could expose de-randomized 
> values.
> ( This isn't fool-proof: if some data value happens to lie within the 
>   random range spuriously then we'll incorrectly transform it. In the 
>   context of oops messages this should not be a big practical problem 
>   though. )

I don't agree that this isn't a big practical problem.  I often find it
necessary to pick out "things that look like pointers".  Overall,
derandomization would make it possible to get really confused when you
have things like half a pointer overwritten.


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