Date: Tue, 01 Oct 2013 22:30:58 -0700 From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, adurbin@...gle.com, Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com>, jln@...gle.com, wad@...gle.com, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@...fujitsu.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...radead.org>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization On 10/01/2013 10:25 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > I mean, for example in an oops message we print data in words: the RIP, > other registers and stack contents. If any of these values lies within the > randomization range then we could de-randomize it. > > So instead of exposing randomized values, we could expose de-randomized > values. > > ( This isn't fool-proof: if some data value happens to lie within the > random range spuriously then we'll incorrectly transform it. In the > context of oops messages this should not be a big practical problem > though. ) > I don't agree that this isn't a big practical problem. I often find it necessary to pick out "things that look like pointers". Overall, derandomization would make it possible to get really confused when you have things like half a pointer overwritten. -hpa
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