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Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2013 12:43:32 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred
On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 11:35:45AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 11:22 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 10:48:55AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, Oct 2, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote:
>> >> >> On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 06:40:41PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> >> >>> On 10/01/2013 01:26 PM, Djalal Harouni wrote:
>> >> >>> > /proc/<pid>/* entries varies at runtime, appropriate permission checks
>> >> >>> > need to happen during each system call.
>> >> >>> >
>> >> >>> > Currently some of these sensitive entries are protected by performing
>> >> >>> > the ptrace_may_access() check. However even with that the /proc file
>> >> >>> > descriptors can be passed to a more privileged process
>> >> >>> > (e.g. a suid-exec) which will pass the classic ptrace_may_access()
>> >> >>> > check. In general the ->open() call will be issued by an unprivileged
>> >> >>> > process while the ->read(),->write() calls by a more privileged one.
>> >> >>> >
>> >> >>> > Example of these files are:
>> >> >>> > /proc/*/syscall, /proc/*/stack etc.
>> >> >>> >
>> >> >>> > And any open(/proc/self/*) then suid-exec to read()/write() /proc/self/*
>> >> >>> >
>> >> >>> >
>> >> >>> > These files are protected during read() by the ptrace_may_access(),
>> >> >>> > however the file descriptor can be passed to a suid-exec which can be
>> >> >>> > used to read data and bypass ASLR. Of course this was discussed several
>> >> >>> > times on LKML.
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> Can you elaborate on what it is that you're fixing? That is, can you
>> >> >>> give a concrete example of what process opens what file and passes the
>> >> >>> fd to what process?
>> >> >> Yes, the references were already given in this email:
>> >> >> https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/31/209
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This has been discussed several times on lkml:
>> >> >> https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/28/544
>> >> >>
>> >> >> https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/8/28/564 (check Kees's references)
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>> I'm having trouble following your description.
>> >> >> Process open a /proc file and pass the fd to a more privilaged process
>> >> >> that will pass the ptrace_may_access() check, while the original process
>> >> >> that opened that file should fail at the ptrace_may_access()
>> >> >
>> >> > So we're talking about two kinds of attacks, right?
>> >>
>> >> Correct.
>> >>
>> >> > Type 1: Unprivileged process does something like open("/proc/1/maps",
>> >> > O_RDONLY) and then passes the resulting fd to something privileged.
>> >>
>> >> ... and then leaks contents back to unprivileged process.
>> >>
>> >> > Type 2: Unprivileged process does something like
>> >> > open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY) and then forks. The parent calls
>> >> > execve on something privileged.
>> >>
>> >> ... and then parent snoops on file contents for the privileged child.
>> >>
>> >> (Type 2 is solved currently, IIUC. Type 1 could be reduced in scope by
>> >> changing these file modes back to 0400.)
>> > Kees for 0400 on /proc/*/maps, it was reported that it could break glibc
>>
>> I didn't mean maps should be 0400. The maps file is already handled
>> differently (pinning mm at open time). I didn't think it was one of
>> the problematic files.
> Kees currently all these files can be used to leak data, except for
> /proc/*/{mem,environ}
>
> These are the only one that pin the mm at open time. But I'm not sure
> that this solution will work for /proc/*/maps since they need vma info
> which will be perhaps freed if task execv, Need to check it.
Ah, yes, you're totally right. I had misremembered.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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