Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
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Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 13:19:39 -0700
From: Julien Tinnes <>
To: Borislav Petkov <>, Kees Cook <>, 
	LKML <>, 
	"" <>, "H. Peter Anvin" <>, 
	Thomas Gleixner <>, Ingo Molnar <>, "" <>, 
	Jarkko Sakkinen <>, Matthew Garrett <>, 
	Matt Fleming <>, Eric Northup <>, 
	Dan Rosenberg <>, Julien Tinnes <>, 
	Will Drewry <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR

On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 7:49 AM, Borislav Petkov <> wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 04, 2013 at 01:07:35PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> This creates CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, so that the base offset of the kernel
>> can be randomized at boot.
> Right,
> if I'm reading this whole deal correctly, I have an issue with this
> in the sense that if this thing is enabled by default and people are
> running stripped kernels, an oops which is being reported is worth sh*t
> since all the addresses there are random and one simply can't map them
> back to which functions the callstack frames are pointing to. Which will
> majorly hinder debuggability, IMHO...

I think it'd be perfectly ok for OOPS to print out the kernel base.

Restricting access to these oopses becomes a different problem
(privilege separation). Some existing sandboxes (Chromium, vsftpd,
openssh..) are already defending against it.


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