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Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 13:23:41 -0700 From: Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com> To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...el.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>, Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>, Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com>, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com> wrote: > On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:12 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote: >> On 04/04/2013 01:07 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> However, the benefits of >>> this feature in certain environments exceed the perceived weaknesses[2]. >> >> Could you clarify? > > I think privilege reduction in general, and sandboxing in particular, > can make KASLR even more useful. A lot of the information leaks can be > mitigated in the same way as attack surface and vulnerabilities can be > mitigated. Case in point: - leaks of 64 bits kernel values to userland in compatibility sub-mode. Sandboxing by using seccomp-bpf can restrict a process to the 64-bit mode API. - restricting access to the syslog() system call Julien
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